Re: Spying in a corporate environment

[Big Joe Jenkins <swarzkopf () legolas sinnerz us>]

"> Like I said before: they log into the local machine instead of logging
> into the domain. Voil, no domain policies applied."

This is absolutely not true and displays a fundamental misunderstanding of 
group policy application. As long as the workstation in question is in a 
site/domain/OU with computer targetted GPO settings linked to it, these 
GPOs will apply to the machine regardless of how a user logs in.

For example, I've created a Windows Firewall GPO that propagates 
restrictive Windows firewall settings to clients. This is a computer 
targetted GPO that is applied to security groups composed of workstation 
accounts. When a user (including local administrator) logs in locally to 
one of the workstations specified in the GPO's filtering, the policy is 
applied and local administrator is unable to modify any Windows firewall 
settings (their only recourse would be to remove the workstation from the 
domain).

Please try this- log in as local administrator to a workstation as 
specified above, and run gpresult or rsop and view the results.


On Thu, 22 Nov 2007, Ansgar -59cobalt- Wiechers wrote:

> On 2007-11-22 Mario DeBono wrote:
> > On 22 November 2007 16:48 Ansgar -59cobalt- Wiechers wrote:
> > > On 2007-11-22 Mario DeBono wrote:
> > > > If you have a 2003 domain enforce group policies and restrict access
> > > > to certain windows components. I presume even if a user has admin
> > > > rights on a pc, he should not be able to over right the group
> > > > policies, if he is not so keen to remove the policies from the pc
> > > > himself.
> > >
> > > You're mistaken. A local admin can override policies (at the very
> > > least for a short while until they are reapplied), and even if that
> > > wasn't possible (s)he can always log on locally, in which case domain
> > > policies don't apply at all. The only way to control users with local
> > > admin privileges is to revoke their local admin privileges.
> > > Everything else are futile efforts.
> >
> > Yep, could be possible, but if you apply the policies on a pc level
> > not user level, than that is some thing different.
>
> No, that doesn't make any difference at all. As long as a local admin is
> a local admin he can acquire any right/privilege whatsoever on that
> machine and can thus override any setting that may have been applied
> through other means. That is what makes a local admin.
>
> > Another way is to apply frequent policy updates depending on the
> > lan/wan you administer. This can be done through login as well.
>
> Like I said before: they log into the local machine instead of logging
> into the domain. Voil?, no domain policies applied.
>
> > OR but I highly don't suggest to do is to
> >
> > Amend files at local security level removing access to local
> > administrators and grant only access to domain admins but you have to
> > be sure of what u are doing else you might end making a mess.
>
> That too doesn't make any difference at all. To repeat myself: a local
> administrator can acquire each and every privilege on the local machine.
> In your example all he has to do is take ownership and grant himself
> access permissions.
>
> If you revoke that privilege from a local admin, you actually demoted
> him from being a local admin. Which - like I said before - is the only
> way to restrict local admins: demote them from being local admins.
>
> Regards
> Ansgar Wiechers
> --
> "All vulnerabilities deserve a public fear period prior to patches
> becoming available."
> --Jason Coombs on Bugtraq