Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: wu-ftpd info.
From: rjq () phys ksu edu (Rob Quinn)
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 1994 13:12:38 -0500 (CDT)
What are the dangers posed by someone gaining root access, as through a trojaned ftpd, in a _chrooted_ environment, assuming that the environment gets chrooted before there's any chance of compromise? Granted, you don't want strangers enabled to wreak havoc with your ftp heirarchy (and planting _more_ trojans), but what kind of threats can be posed to the rest of the system from such a toehold?
Assuming they can put some program there and run it as root, they could get access to things that aren't restricted in a chroot environment, like: privileged sockets on the local machine device file creation(?) create a setuid sh that a normal user (not chroot'ed) could use kill() any process (and then replace it) ie. telnetd or login. etc etc -- | let's all be different | | just like me Rob Quinn | | rjq () phys ksu edu | | QuinnBob@KSUVM.BITNET |
Current thread:
- wu-ftpd info. Christopher Klaus (Apr 12)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Paul A Vixie (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Paul Walmsley (Apr 13)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Ken Hardy (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. jdd () cdf toronto edu (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Paul A Vixie (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Rob Quinn (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Gene Spafford (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Marc W. Mengel (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Christopher Klaus (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. smb () research att com (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. William McVey (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. der Mouse (Apr 13)
- Re: wu-ftpd info. Paul A Vixie (Apr 13)