Re: NCSA httpd 1.3

[ken () bridge com (Ken Hardy)]

> However, perhaps another rule:
>    Avoid using strncat(dest, src, n) or strncpy(dest, src, n), etc, as they
>    _also_ do no checking on the max length of "dest", although 'n' can be
>    properly calculated & make them safe.
>
> Perhaps, instead, it's time to write a new series of string manipulators....
> ones that do the following:
> 1)  Behave similarly to the existing functions (like sprintf(), strncat(),
>    strncpy(), but take an additional argument "destlen", which is (of course)
>    the max length of the destination string.
> 2)  Do the string-function, but if the "dest" string will be overrun, return an
>    error code AND post to the syslog function.

Seems like this is begging for a "safe" string class for C++; I'm sure
that length-safe classes exist.  Subclass off that for "safer" classes
to handle the special characters a la the latest sendmail brouhaha.

[I conveniently ignore the fact that all the common source base out
 there is C (probably a lot of it not even ANSI), and the increased
 opportunities that C++ gives for obfuscated code.]

-- KH