Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: [linux-security] Re: Possible bufferoverflow condition in
From: nick () zeta org au (Nick Andrew)
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 1996 11:14:16 +1000
Forwarding a message from don () paranoia com:
The problem in mount, aside from the obvious buffer overrun, is that the most basic maxim for coding privileged programs was ignored--again. All privileged programs should run without those privileges enabled except during execution of the critical code that needs them. For example: main() { ... /* variable decls */ seteuid( getuid() ); ... /* non-privileged code, including sprintf() */ seteuid( 0 ); [...]
This doesn't aid security in the case of running code from the stack, since the inserted code can easily do 'seteuid(0)' at any time. Dropping privileges is useful when one is trying to avoid filesystem races and it's a cheap way of getting the kernel to do your program's checking for it. However, any program which can regain root privileges and have its instruction execution compromised is a path to root for crackers.
"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." -- Edmund Burke
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Current thread:
- Re: [linux-security] Re: Possible bufferoverflow condition in Nick Andrew (Aug 15)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: [linux-security] Re: Possible bufferoverflow condition in Casper Dik (Aug 16)
- Re: [linux-security] Re: Possible bufferoverflow condition in Zygo Blaxell (Aug 21)