Bugtraq mailing list archives

RSI.0009.09-08-98.ALL.OMNIBACK


From: advise () ENIGMA REPSEC COM (RSI Advise)
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 17:30:20 -0700


RSI.0009.09-08-98.ALL.OMNIBACK



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                   Repent Security Incorporated, RSI
                       [ http://www.repsec.com ]


                       *** RSI ALERT ADVISORY ***


--- [CREDIT] --------------------------------------------------------------

'Bermuda Brian': Research and development
Mark Zielinski : Author of advisory


--- [SUMMARY] -------------------------------------------------------------

Announced:     August 18, 1998
Report code:   RSI.0009.09-08-98.HP-UX.OMNIBACK
Report title:  Omniback
Vulnerability: Several vulnerabilities have been discovered
               which can allow an attacker to execute remote commands,
               impersonate another user, and overwrite any file
               on the server.
Vendor status: Hewlett Packard contacted on August 18, 1998
Patch status:  Patches are being developed by Hewlett Packard
Platforms:     Any platform with the Omniback package installed
Reference:     http://www.repsec.com/advisories.html
Impact:        If exploited, users can execute commands and
               gain root access remotely, and overwrite any file
               on the system locally.

Special Note:  Although Omniback is not known to be shipped with
               any operating system, many platforms are supported
               by the Omniback software package according to
               Hewlett-Packard.

               Installation of Omniback on any system could
               potentially leave you vulnerable.

--- [DETAILS] -------------------------------------------------------------


Problem:       Three problems are covered in this advisory:

                 The first issue allows an attacker to remotely
                 execute commands on the server by sending arbitrary
                 data with a ";" after commands such as "CELL"
                 or "INFO".

                 The second issue also allows remote execution of commands
                 by impersonating a valid user and Omniback server.

                 The third issue allows for any file on the system
                 to be overwritten locally via a /tmp symlink problem.

               These problems are present in the 2.1, and 2.5
               Omniback Cell servers, disk agents, and media agents.

               The Omniback protocol is vulnerable to spoofing attacks
               which introduces these vulnerabilities:

               Vulnerability #1:  Omniback allows commands to be executed
                                  with root access since it requires full
                                  access to the local filesystem.

                                  By sending arbitrary data to the Omniback
                                  server containing commands such as
                                  "CELL;command" or "INFO;command",
                                  an attacker can execute commands as root.

               Vulnerability #2:  Omniback also allows remote commands to
                                  be executed through a second process.

                                  Any user that can impersonate the
                                  Omniback Cell server can start a
                                  job on the remote system and potentially
                                  execute commands as root.

               Vulnerability #3:  Omniback allows an arbitrary local user
                                  overwrite any file on the filesystem.

                                  By symlinking /tmp/util.tmp to
                                  the file you want to create/overwrite
                                  and sending the Omniback server an
                                  UNSECURE command, you can potentially
                                  create/overwrite that file.

               This software has also been ported to a number of other
               platforms which are currently untested, but may
               be subject to the same vulnerabilities:

                 SGI IRIX 5.3
                 SNI Sinix 5.4.2
                 IBM AIX 3.2.5, 4.1
                 Hewlett Packard HP-UX 9.0, 10.0, 10.20, 11.0
                 Sun Microsystems SunOS 4.1.3, 4.1.4, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6
                 Novell Netware 3.11, 3.12, 4.01, 4.1
                 Microsoft Windows NT Server & Workstation 3.51, 4.0
                 Further platforms can be included via NFS and shared disks



--- [FIX] -----------------------------------------------------------------

Solution:      The following temporary solutions exist to help deal with the
               above issues, however each solution may not be best suited
               for your network or adequately deal with the problems.

               Adding access controls to 'inetd.sec' could potentially
               limit the scope of a network attack, but would not be
               considered a complete or failsafe solution.

               Blocking port 5555 at the external router of your network
               will defend against most Internet based attacks, but could
               potentially interfere with other applications that may use
               port 5555 such as 'personal-agent'. Current IANA port
               assignments include a note (in comments) that HP Omniback
               also uses this port, but does not specifically assign it
               to the Omniback service. This solution will not protect you
               from internal/Intranet attacks.

               The last solution is to disable Omniback until a patch
               is provided by your vendor.


--- [PATCH] ---------------------------------------------------------------

Solution:      HP has informed us that patches are in process to address
               issues #1 and #3.


---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Repent Security Incorporated (RSI)
13610 N. Scottsdale Rd.
Suite #10-326
Scottsdale, AZ 85254

E-Mail: advise () repsec com
FTP: ftp://ftp.repsec.com
WWW: http://www.repsec.com

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Copyright September 1998  RepSec, Inc.

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