Re: user flags in public temp space (was Re: chflags() [heads up])

[atatat () ATATDOT NET (Andrew Brown)]

> > Possible long-term fixes we've theo-rized:
>
> A strange pun.

yes.:)

> > c) Make root automatically override user-set flags (possibly will
> > create other complications for user-land programs relying on root
> > passing over such files).  This would be akin to Solaris 2.51 and 2.6's
> > ACLs.
>
> This should also probably be looked into a bit more, but currently I
> am leaning away from this being right.  It's a rather large change to
> the way flags work.  Do we also then make dump not honour user
> nodump.. oh, wait, dump is run by root.... no, that would not make
> sense, would it.  So it becomes somewhat inconsistant.  To some
> degree, securelevels are trying to make root more equal to users.

perhaps...it might be acceptable to allow root to unlink(2) files
inspite of user flags to the contrary at secure level 0?  that *would*
work around the immediate problem.

usually root is the only one running stuff at that level anyway,
right?

fwiw - imho, solaris acls are almost useless.  four out of five times
i'd tried to accomplish anything with them, it hasn't worked anyway.

--
|-----< "CODE WARRIOR" >-----|
codewarrior () daemon org             * "ah!  i see you have the internet
twofsonet () graffiti com (Andrew Brown)                that goes *ping*!"
andrew () crossbar com       * "information is power -- share the wealth."