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Fw: CERT Summary CS-99.04


From: bsehmel () NARROWS COM (Sehmel, William C.)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 1999 00:39:02 -0800


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CERT Summary CS-99-04

  November 23, 1999

  Each quarter, the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) issues the CERT
  summary to draw attention to the types of attacks reported to our
  incident response team, as well as other noteworthy incident and
  vulnerability information. The summary includes pointers to sources of
  information for dealing with the problems.

  Past CERT summaries are available from
  http://www.cert.org/summaries/
  ______________________________________________________________________

Reminder: New CERT/CC PGP Key

  On October 4, 1999, the PGP key for the CERT/CC was replaced with a
  new PGP key. For more information, see

  http://www.cert.org/contact_cert/encryptmail.html
  ______________________________________________________________________

"CERT/CC Current Activity" Web Page

  The CERT/CC Current Activity web page is a regularly updated summary
  of the most frequent, high-impact types of security incidents and
  vulnerabilities currently being reported to the CERT/CC. It is
  available from

  http://www.cert.org/current/current_activity.html

  The information on the Current Activity page will be reviewed and
  updated as reporting trends change.
  ______________________________________________________________________

Year 2000 (Y2K) Information

  The CERT/CC has published information regarding the Y2K problem:

  Y2K Information
      http://www.cert.org/y2k-info/
  ______________________________________________________________________

Recent Activity

  Since the last CERT summary, issued in August 1999 (CS-99-03), we have
  published advisories on WU-FTPD, BIND, CDE, and AMD. We have also
  analyzed and published information regarding distributed intruder
  tools. Among other activity, we continue to see widespread scans for
  known vulnerabilities.

   1. Distributed Intruder Tools
      Denial of Service
      We have received reports of intruders compromising machines in
      order to install distributed systems used for launching packet
      flooding denial-of-service attacks. The systems typically contain
      a small number of servers and a large number of clients. These
      reports indicate that machines participating in such distributed
      systems are likely to have been root compromised. You can find
      more information in

       CERT Incident Note 99-07
               http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-99-07.html

      Sniffer
      We have received reports of intruders using distributed network
      sniffers to capture usernames and passwords. The distributed
      sniffer consists of a client and a server portion. As of this
      summary, the sniffer clients have been found exclusively on
      compromised Linux hosts. For more information please see

       CERT Incident Note 99-06
               http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-99-06.html

   2. CDE Vulnerabilities
      Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in some
      distributions of the Common Desktop Environment (CDE). These
      vulnerabilities are different from those discussed in CA-98.02 and
      can lead to intruders gaining root access on vulnerable systems.
      For more information please see

       CERT Advisory CA-99-11
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-1-CDE.html

   3. BIND Vulnerabilities
      Several vulnerabilities have been found in BIND, the popular
      domain name server from the Internet Software Consortium (ISC).
      One of these vulnerabilities may allow remote intruders to gain
      privileged access to name servers. The others can severely disrupt
      the operation of the name server. For more information, please see

       CERT Advisory CA-99-14
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-14-bind.html

   4. WU-FTPD Vulnerabilities
      Three vulnerabilities have been identified in WU-FTPD and other
      ftp daemons based on the WU-FTPD source code. WU-FTPD is a common
      package used to provide File Transfer Protocol (FTP) services.
      Remote and local intruders may be able to exploit these
      vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code as the user running the
      ftp daemon (usually root). Incidents involving the first of these
      three vulnerabilities have been reported to the CERT Coordination
      Center. For more information please see

       CERT Advisory CA-99-13
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-13-wuftpd.html

   5. AMD Vulnerabilities
      There is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the logging facility
      of the amd daemon. This daemon automatically mounts file systems
      in response to attempts to access files that reside on those file
      systems. Remote intruders can exploit this vulnerability to
      execute arbitrary code as the user running the amd daemon (usually
      root). For more information see

       CERT Advisory CA-99-12
               http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-12-amd.html

               We have received reports regarding exploits of this
               vulnerability. For more information please see

               CERT Incident Note 99-05
               http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-99-05.html

   6. RPC Vulnerabilities
      We continue to receive reports of exploitations involving three
      RPC vulnerabilities: rpc.cmsd, ttdbserverd, and statd/automountd.
      These exploitations can lead to root compromise on systems that
      implement vulnerable RPC services. Analysis has shown that similar
      artifacts have been found on compromised systems. For more
      information on the vulnerabilities please see
       CERT Incident Note 99-04
           http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-99-04.html
           CERT Advisory CA-99-08
           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-08-cmsd.html
           CERT Advisory CA-99-05
           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-05-statd-automountd.html
           CERT Advisory CA-98-11
           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.11.tooltalk.html
   7. Virus and Trojan Horse Activity
      We continue to see reports of virus activity. Current versions of
      anti-virus software can help to protect your systems from these
      viruses.
      It is important to take great caution with any email or Usenet
      attachments that contain executable content. If you receive a
      message containing attachments, scan the message file with
      anti-virus software before you open or run the file. Doing this
      does not guarantee that the contents of the file are safe, but it
      lowers your risk of virus infection by checking for viruses and
      Trojan horses that your scanning software can detect.
      CERT/CC has published a Virus Resources page that includes
      information on

         Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about Computer Viruses

         Hoax and Chain Letter Databases

         Virus Databases

         Virus Organizations and Publications

         Anti-Virus Vendors

         Virus Related Papers

      Please see

       Virus Resources
               http://www.cert.org/other_sources/viruses.html

   8. Continued Widespread Scans
      We continue to receive reports of scanning and probing activity.
      The most frequent reports tend to involve services that have
      well-known vulnerabilities. Hosts continue to be affected by
      exploitation of well-known vulnerabilities in these services.
       sunrpc (TCP port 111) and mountd (635)
           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.12.mountd.html
           http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-99-04.html
           IMAP (TCP port 143)
           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.09.imapd.html
           POP3 (TCP port 110)
           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.08.qpopper_vul.html
           DNS (TCP port 53 [domain])
           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.05.bind_problems.html
           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-97.22.bind.html
  ______________________________________________________________________

What's New and Updated

  Since the last CERT summary, we have developed new and updated
    * Advisories
    * CERT statistics
    * Incident notes
    * Tech tips/FAQs
    * Y2K information

  There are descriptions of these documents and links to them on our
  "What's New" web page at
  http://www.cert.org/nav/whatsnew.html
  ______________________________________________________________________

  This document is available from:
  http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-99-04.html
  ______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

  Email: cert () cert org
         Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
         Fax: +1 412-268-6989
         Postal address:
         CERT Coordination Center
         Software Engineering Institute
         Carnegie Mellon University
         Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
         U.S.A.

  CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
  Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
  hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

Using encryption

  We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
  Our public PGP key is available from

  http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

  If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
  information.

Getting security information

  CERT publications and other security information are available from
  our web site

  http://www.cert.org/

  To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
  email to cert-advisory-request () cert org and include SUBSCRIBE
  your-email-address in the subject of your message.

  Copyright 1999 Carnegie Mellon University.
  Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be
  found in

  http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html

  * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
  Patent and Trademark Office.
  ______________________________________________________________________

  NO WARRANTY
  Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
  Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
  Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
  implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
  fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
  results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
  does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
  patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.

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