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xchat IRC session hijacking vulnerability (versions 1.4.1, 1.4.2)


From: zen-parse <zen-parse () gmx net>
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2002 22:45:13 +1300 (NZDT)

==========================================================================
======= xchat 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 IRC session hijacking vulnerability ========
==========================================================================

  It is possible to trick xchat IRC clients (1.4.2, 1.4.3) into sending 
  commands to the IRC server they are on, potentially allowing for social 
  engineering attacks, channel takeovers, and denial of service.

               Vendor updates for affected versions soon.

==========================================================================
================================ Background ==============================
==========================================================================

The CTCP PING reply handler is designed to return the string that was sent
to it by another client. This enables that client to determine the time 
lag between them and another user.

The querying client types
  /ping nick
which sends a command of the form:
  PRIVMSG nick :\x01PING 1027050764\x01\n

Where "1027050764" was some representation of the current time, and \x01 
is the character with the ASCII value 0x01.
The queried client would respond with:
  NOTICE nick :\xPING 1027050764\x01\n
and the querying client would then compare the current time with the time 
in the string.

If you sent "test 1 2 3 4" as the time part, xchat would reply with the 
same string.

The xchat client also has a feature which allows insertion of arbitrary 
ascii valued characters into a message. 

The message "This is %065 test." gets sent as "This is A test." to the
server. (This option is disabled by default in later versions.)

If these expressions are expanded on the sending client, a ping messsage
could be sent to a user with the command:
  /msg nick %001PING 12345678%001 
which would send a string like:
  PRIVMSG nick :\x01PING 12345678\x01

(To disable expansion in xchat when you are typing them, use '%%nnn' to 
send the '%nnn' literal. Eg: to send '%100x', type '%%100x' in the 
client. If your client does expansion, it would show up as 'dx', which 
can be quite annoying when discussing format strings.)

==========================================================================
=============================== The Problem ==============================
==========================================================================

The PING reply handler also expands the %nnn values in replies in the 
vulnerable clients.

Example exploit, By Marcus Meissner <Marcus.Meissner () caldera de>

#fupp is a channel.
Victim is on it and has channel op status.


Enter the command: cat xchat.exploit - | netcat server 6667 

(The - is necessary so we do not quit instantely)

This causes vulnerable 'Victim' to give user 'exploit' channel operator
status in channel '#fupp' on server 'server'.


-- zen-parse

========================================================================== 
=         ObSpam: http://mp3.com/cosv/ - You know I want you to.         = 
========================================================================== 
= 1337sp34|< @ |r(://|r(.pu||thep|ug.(0m/ {#r00th@t,#s0c|a|} @n|) 5tuff. =
==========================================================================
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Attachment: xchat.exploit
Description:


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