Re: Solaris priocntl exploit

[Casper Dik <Casper.Dik () Sun COM>]

> > The module's name is a relative path, priocntl will search the module file
> > in only /kernel/sched and /usr/kernel/sched/ dirs.
> > but unfortunately, priocntl() never check '../' in pc_clname arg
> > we can use '../../../tmp/module' to make priocntl() load a module from anywhere
>
>
> The "pc_clname[]" argument is limited in size; to prevent this particular
> bug from being exploited you could:
>
>
>       for dir in /kernel /usr/kernel
>       do
>               cd $dir
>               mkdir -p a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h
>               mv sched a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h
>               ln -s a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/sched .
>       done


Just a small amendment; the code also doesn't add a trailing NUL to the
pathname copied from user space, so we actually need to take care
about the rest of the size of the structure.  (16 + 32 bytes; i.e.,
16 levels of ../)

So this should really keep the bad kernel module out:

        for dir in /kernel /usr/kernel
        do
                cd $dir
                mkdir -p a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j/k/l/m/n/o/p
                mv sched a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j/k/l/m/n/o/p
                ln -s a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j/k/l/m/n/o/p/sched .
        done

Casper