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[OpenPKG-SA-2002.010] OpenPKG Security Advisory (apache)


From: OpenPKG <openpkg () openpkg org>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 14:27:48 +0200

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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security () openpkg org                         openpkg () openpkg org
OpenPKG-SA-2002.010                                          23-Oct-2002
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             apache
Vulnerability:       cross side scripting
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:        Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG 1.0          <= apache-1.3.22-1.0.5    >= apache-1.3.22-1.0.6
OpenPKG 1.1          <= apache-1.3.26-1.1.1    >= apache-1.3.26-1.1.2
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= apache-1.3.27-20021009 >= apache-1.3.27-20021023

Description:
  Joe Orton <jorton () redhat com> discovered a cross site scripting (XSS)
  bug [3] in mod_ssl [1], the SSL/TLS component for the Apache webserver
  [2]. Like the other recent Apache XSS bugs, this only affects servers
  using a combination of "UseCanonicalName off" (_not_ the default in
  OpenPKG package of Apache) and a wildcard A record of the server in
  the DNS. Although this combination for HTTPS servers is even less
  common than with plain HTTP servers, this nevertheless could allow
  remote attackers to execute client-side script code as other web page
  visitors via the HTTP "Host" header.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
  apache". If you have an affected version of the "apache" package (see
  above), upgrade it according to the solution below. Remember to also
  rebuild and reinstall any dependent OpenPKG packages. [4]

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [5][6][7], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service or a mirror location,
  verify its integrity [8], build a corresponding binary RPM from it
  and update your OpenPKG installation by finally installing the binary
  RPM [4]. For the latest OpenPKG 1.1 release, perform the following
  operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
  adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/1.1/UPD
  ftp> get apache-1.3.26-1.1.2.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --checksig apache-1.3.26-1.1.2.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild apache-1.3.26-1.1.2.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/apache-1.3.26-1.1.2.*.rpm
  # <prefix>/etc/rc apache stop start
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [1]  http://www.modssl.org/
  [2]  http://httpd.apache.org/
  [3]  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-0840
  [4]  http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [5]  ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/apache-1.3.22-1.0.6.src.rpm
  [6]  ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/apache-1.3.26-1.1.2.src.rpm
  [7]  ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/current/SRC/apache-1.3.27-20021023.src.rpm
  [8]  http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg () openpkg org>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For example, pipe this message to
the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
________________________________________________________________________
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