Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: Buffer overflow prevention
From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver () CS berkeley edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2003 12:13:27 -0700
On Wed, Aug 13, 2003 at 02:28:33PM +0400, Eygene A. Ryabinkin composed:
I have an idea on buffer overflow prevention. I doubt that it's new, but I haven't seen an implementation of it in any freely distributable Un*x system. So, I hardly need your comments on it.
Then why post this to a public list? Sorry, you are going to get comments.
Preliminary: I'm talking about Intel x86 architecture, but maybe it will be applicable to others as well.
The idea itself: all (correct me if I'm wrong) buffer overflows are based on the fact that we're using the stack, referenced by SS:ESP pair, both for procedure return address and for local variables. It seems to me, that would we have two stacks -- one for real stack and one for variables -- it will solve a bunch of problems. So, my suggestion: let us organise two segments: one for normal stack, growing downwards, referenced by SS:ESP pair and the second one, for local variables, referenced by GS:EBP pair, with either upwards or downwards growing. Now, if we use first segment for passing variables and procedure return addresses (normal stack usage), and second segment only for local procedure variables, we will have the following advantages:
1) Local variables and return address will be physically (by means of CPU) divided and it will not be possible to touch the return address by overflowing local buffer.
2) The procedure introduces only one extra register -- GS, since EBP is very often used for the stack frame.
On the x86, introducing ONE extra reserved register into the calling convention is a performance killer: the ISA is far too register poor already.
Of course, this two segments can be made non-executable, just in case.
What we need to implement the idea: first, rewrite kernel to organise two segments for every process and to place proper values into the segment registers upon the program startup. Second, rewrite the compiler to support the new scheme of local variables addresation. So, the changes are minimal, in some sence. As I said, I hardly need your criticism, suggestions, etc. of any type.
This only stops attacks which overwrite the return address pointers on the stack, it doesn't stop heap overflows or other control-flow attacks. As such, it seems like this only stops the same class of attacks which StackGuard-style checking halts: manipulation of the return address pointer through data overflows. Since stackguard-techniques already exist, are very mature, and is included as "On By Default" on OpenBSD and potentially on other platforms (including possibly Windows, it is in Microsoft's latest compiler and I think that all new code from Microsoft turns on this compiler flag [1]), there is no sense inventing new structures, which require substantially more changes to the infrastructure, which don't offer any more protection. [1] If microsoft doesn't have this flag turn on on their own products, this would be a lawsuit waiting to happen. -- Nicholas C. Weaver nweaver () cs berkeley edu
Current thread:
- Buffer overflow prevention Eygene A. Ryabinkin (Aug 13)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Nicholas Weaver (Aug 13)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention weigelt (Aug 13)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Michal Zalewski (Aug 13)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention weigelt (Aug 13)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Crispin Cowan (Aug 13)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Michal Zalewski (Aug 13)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Sam Baskinger (Aug 14)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Crispin Cowan (Aug 15)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention weigelt (Aug 15)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Sam Baskinger (Aug 14)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Jonathan A. Zdziarski (Aug 13)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Andreas Beck (Aug 14)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Jingmin (Jimmy) Zhou (Aug 13)
(Thread continues...)
- Re: Buffer overflow prevention Nicholas Weaver (Aug 13)