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Vulnerability in Symantec Anti Virus Corporate Edition v9.x


From: golovast () gmail com
Date: 31 Aug 2005 17:35:45 -0000

The vulnerability has been identified and confirmed in versions 9.0.1.x and 9.0.4.x. I am fairly certain that it exists 
in all releases of version 9 and possibly other versions as well. 

Essentially, the program can be configured to receive updates via Symantec's or an Internal Live update server. If it 
is configured to receive updates from an internal server, information such as : server name, IP address, subnet, subnet 
mask, connection protocol, username and password has to be entered. 

This information gets stored in  "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\Symantec\LiveUpdate\Settings.LiveUpdate" file and it does store the username and password in an encrypted format. 

The vulnerability shows itself when the server actually gets the updates from the LiveUpdate server. The logging 
information about the transaction gets written to "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\Symantec\LiveUpdate\Log.Liveupdate" file. 
In that file, regardless of whether the update was successful or not, username and password that are used to connect to 
the Internal LiveUpdate server are available in clear text. 

Examples:

8/24/2005, 17:28:14 PM GMT -> Progress Update: DOWNLOAD_SEGMENT_BATCH_START: Downloading segmented file 
1124829658jtun_ennluxdb.x86.full.zip (size 12401134) instead of update file 
http://domain\username:*******@x.x.x.x/1124829658jtun_ennluxdb.x86 (size 18047217) 

8/31/2005, 0:51:43 AM GMT -> Progress Update: DOWNLOAD_SEGMENT_FILE_START: Downloading segment file 
http://username:******@x.x.x.x/segments/1125123146jtun_ennluxdb.x86.seg1.zip instead of update 
1125123146jtun_ennluxdb.x86: file size 3584000

8/31/2005, 0:51:43 AM GMT -> Progress Update: DOWNLOAD_FILE_START: URL: 
"http://username:******@x.x.x.x/segments/1125123146jtun_ennluxdb.x86.seg1.zip";, Estimated Size: 3584000, Destination 
Folder: "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Symantec\LiveUpdate\Downloads"


This can be exploited in a variety of ways. Most obvious is elevation of privileges. Someone can have access with 
limited permission to login to a server in a low security zone. They will be able to access the log file, since it is 
located in the "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\....\.." directory, which is available to all users. A username and 
password to a service account or a domain account on the Internal LiveUpdate server can be obtained and used to gain 
access to that server or other servers in a different security zone. 





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