Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design

[3APA3A <3APA3A () SECURITY NNOV RU>]

Dear Hadmut Danisch,

 2-factor authentication is not a way to protect against malware.

 SecurID  authentication  supports  single sign-on technology. As a weak
 side  of  this  technology,  it means, if single account on any network
 host  is  compromised,  this  account  is compromised in whole network,
 because  any resource can be accessed from compromised host. An ability
 to read current key from device is required to support single sign-on.

 The  only  additional  attack factor this issue creates is attacker can
 get  _physical_  access  to  console with user's credentials _any time_
 while  user is logged in, while in case token can not be red (e.g. it's
 not plugged to USB) he can only access console short after user logs in
 to compromised host (while token is not changed).


--Thursday, September 7, 2006, 10:49:52 PM, you wrote to full-disclosure () lists grok org uk:


HD> However, if the Token Code can be read over the USB bus, this
HD> assumption does not hold. A single attack on the PC where the token is
HD> plugged in would compromise both the PIN (e.g. with a keylogger) and
HD> the token itself (e.g. writing a daemon which continuously polls the
HD> token and forwards the token in real time to a remote attacker.



-- 
~/ZARAZA
http://www.security.nnov.ru/