Bugtraq mailing list archives
Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability
From: Glynn Clements <glynn () gclements plus com>
Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2007 14:37:30 +0100
Dan Yefimov wrote:
However, the bug in question allows sending signals which cannot be blocked or ignored (SIGKILL, SIGSTOP). Moreover, the cause (PDEATHSIG) cannot be disabledReally? An what if we fork right after startup and perform operations as a child?
That would work, but might have undesirable consequences of its own. In particular, it prevents a non-malicious caller from using PDEATHSIG to send e.g. SIGINT, which the setuid program may reasonably handle.
SIGKILL and SIGSTOP cannot be blocked, handled or ignored.As for SIGKILL, I again repeat that the program must operate in a fail safe way when that makes sense.
It's really a question of whether it's possible rather than "making sense". Eliminating critical sections is desirable, but it isn't always possible.
BTW, SIGKILL and SIGSTOP can be issued by an O_ASYNC file I/O also (look in fcntl(2) at F_SETSIG section). If you use F_SETSIG for sending SIGKILL or SIGSTOP, there's nothing to be done with that - that behaviour is well documented and setuid root program must know which file descriptor should be closed to prevent that, which is of course not possible. The only cure here is closing every file descriptor above 2, but that is still insufficient, since fcntl() might be issued on file descriptors from 0 to 2.
The fcntl(2) manpage says: Sending a signal to the owner process (group) specified by F_SETOWN is subject to the same permissions checks as are described for kill(2), where the sending process is the one that employs F_SETOWN (but see BUGS below). Also, note the use of the term "permissions checks"; this is considered a security mechanism.
Signals which don't terminate the process may still have undesirable consequences, e.g. use of SIGUSR1 as a secure signalling mechanism (at least, it's supposed to be secure).Supposed by whom and why? Where is the guarantee? As I said previously, arbitrary signal can be issued in a couple of ways.
Here's a hint: EPERM is amongst the possible error codes for kill(). Also, the capabilities(7) manpage lists: CAP_KILL Bypass permission checks for sending signals (see kill(2)). This includes use of the KDSIGACCEPT ioctl. Again, use of the term "permissions checks". The ability to send signals to a process is subject to security restrictions. Therefore, any bug which allows these restrictions to be bypassed is a security bug. Linux attempts to apply similar checks to PDEATHSIG, but this bug allows them to be circumvented.
Sending asynchronous signals to setuid/setgid children is supposed to be impossible, and that restriction is considered a security mechanism.And this IS generally impossible. Once spawned setuid root binary that will send a signal while dying, you have no control over the moment the signal is being sent at. The exploitation scenario for this bug is a bit artificial.
IMO, privilege elevation is a security issue regardless of whether or not one can provide a "useful" scenario immediately upon the issue becoming known. -- Glynn Clements <glynn () gclements plus com>
Current thread:
- COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Wojciech Purczynski (Aug 14)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 14)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Wojciech Purczynski (Aug 14)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Glynn Clements (Aug 15)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 15)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Glynn Clements (Aug 16)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 16)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Glynn Clements (Aug 16)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 17)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Glynn Clements (Aug 17)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 17)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Glynn Clements (Aug 20)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 20)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 14)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Nicolas Rachinsky (Aug 17)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 17)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 15)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Wojciech Purczynski (Aug 15)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Dan Yefimov (Aug 15)
- Re: COSEINC Linux Advisory #1: Linux Kernel Parent Process Death Signal Vulnerability Wojciech Purczynski (Aug 15)