Comments re ISC's announcement on bind9 security

["Network Protocol Security" <netprotosec () gmail com>]

BugTraq

I found this ISC announcement quite amusing:
http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/sw/bind/docs/response_transaction_id_issues.php
It's a text published by ISC as a follow up to the bind9 predictable id saga.

Particularly the following statement is funny, and shows complete lack
of understanding of the terminology and of the problem space:

'ISC would like to assure the Internet community that this is much
less an issue of using "extremely weak crypto" as it has been
described, than the use of a random number generator that did not
provide sufficient randomness.'

My understanding is that they used a pseudo random number generator in
bind9, and when you use a pseudo random number generator (whose
sequence in this case is predictable after observing about a dozen
outputs) instead of a strong cryptographic algorithm whose sequence
cannot be practically predictable, how do you call this? right -
"extremely weak crypto".

The irony is that statement is found in a text intended to instill
trust and reassure the bind9 users that ISC digs security...

(another mistake in the ISC announcement is right at the top of the
page, where it reads "In June of 2007, a problem regarding Transaction
ID generation in BIND 9.4.1 (and prior) was reported to Internet
Systems Consortium (ISC) engineers." but according to Trusteer, they
reported it on May 29th:
http://www.trusteer.com/docs/bind9dns.html#chapter_4)