Bugtraq mailing list archives
RE: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory
From: "Dave Korn" <dave.korn () artimi com>
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2008 17:31:15 +0100
Eric Rescorla wrote on 08 August 2008 16:06:
At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 11:50:59 +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:However, since the CRLs will almost certainly not be checked, this means the site will still be vulnerable to attack for the lifetime of the certificate (and perhaps beyond, depending on user behaviour). Note that shutting down the site DOES NOT prevent the attack. Therefore mitigation falls to other parties. 1. Browsers must check CRLs by default.Isn't this a good argument for blacklisting the keys on the client side?
Isn't that exactly what "Browsers must check CRLs" means in this context anyway? What alternative client-side blacklisting mechanism do you suggest? cheers, DaveK -- Can't think of a witty .sigline today....
Current thread:
- OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Ben Laurie (Aug 08)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Eric Rescorla (Aug 08)
- RE: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Dave Korn (Aug 08)
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Eric Rescorla (Aug 08)
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Ben Laurie (Aug 08)
- Re: [OpenID] OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Dick Hardt (Aug 08)
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Perry E. Metzger (Aug 08)
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Nicolas Williams (Aug 08)
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Paul Hoffman (Aug 08)
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Nicolas Williams (Aug 08)
- RE: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Dave Korn (Aug 08)
- RE: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Dave Korn (Aug 08)
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Peter Gutmann (Aug 08)
- Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory Dan Kaminsky (Aug 08)