Re: /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on Linux

[Dan Yefimov <dan () lightwave net ru>]

On 26.10.2009 23:05, Isara Beaumont wrote:
> Dan Yefimov said:
>
> > > I do not think mounting /proc should change access control semantics.
> > It didn't in fact change anything. If the guest created hardlink to that file in
> > a unrestricted location, what would you say? Procfs is in that respect just
> > another sort of hardlinks, whether you like that or not. If you didn't in fact
> > restrict an access to the file, you're on your own.
>
> (1) This is WRONG, and I find it interesting that nobody bothered to check
> or test this. The POSIX standard mandates that link() shall fail if
> the user has no search
> permission for any of the directories in the path prefix of oldpath or newpath.
>
> Therefore, setting the directory permission to 0700 protects from hardlink
> creation (read that again!) and this bug in the /proc filesystem
> indeed lead to a
> change in access control semantics. Under POSIX, the file IS unwriteable,
> because it is protected by the permissions on the parent directory.
>
> (2) While it's irrelevant for his argument, the script by Pavel Machek has a
> race condition. The 'chmod 700 /tmp/my_priv' should be done before the
> file is created, not
> afterwards. Otherwise there is a window where the file exists, but hardlink
> creation is not prevented by the directory permissions.
Your (2) contradicts to (1) and confirms what I told, if you didn't notice that.
--

Sincerely Your, Dan.