iPhone certificate flaws

[cryptopath () gmail com]

iPhones can be configured over the air by inviting users to download .mobileconfig files from a URL. This feature is 
used by large companies and universities to distribute various settings to a large number of iPhones.

For security reasons, these files need to be cryptographically signed to be trusted and shown as such. It appears that 
there is a flaw in the trust chain used by iPhones to validate .mobileconfig signers. Any signature certificate issued 
by a root CA present in the Safari keystore will be trusted. This is the case for e.g. demo certificates delivered by 
Verisign (Level 1) at no cost and without any verification.

Using this, it is easy for a phisher to create a mobileconfig files that re-directs all HTTP traffic to a dedicated 
server, sign it with a certificate identifying it as issued by an authority of their choice, and having it trusted by 
the iPhone. These config files also allow to place additional root certificates in an iPhone, making it possible to 
install man-in-the-middle HTTPS attacks.

More information is available from:
http://cryptopath.wordpress.com/2010/01/29/iphone-certificate-flaws/