Bugtraq mailing list archives

Re: Windows Platform Binary Table (WPBT) - BIOS PE backdoor


From: Kevin Beaumont <kevin.beaumont () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 19:48:26 +0100

Hi Dimirti,

The specification says it is supported (and slightly expanded) in
Windows 10, and I can confirm through testing the method still works
on Windows 10 - I was successfully able to extract files from a
Windows BitLockered drive.

On 13 August 2015 at 14:33, Limanovski, Dimitri
<dimitri.limanovski () blackrock com> wrote:
Hi Kevin,
I too was looking at this, and it does look absolutely horrendous. More so, that Microsoft does not provide a good 
measure to control WPBT: in the official doc there's some watered down paragraph about "good security measures", but 
there's no way to enforce binary signing, or CA-like validation of the signature. One thing is not clear is whether 
Windows 10 is vulnerable to the same functionality, and whether the malicious actors can write to WPBT directly, or, 
like the case with Lenovo, have to hijack "trusted" OEM apps that are allowed to do so.

Dimitri

-----Original Message-----
From: Kevin Beaumont [mailto:kevin.beaumont () gmail com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2015 7:45 AM
To: bugtraq () securityfocus com
Subject: Windows Platform Binary Table (WPBT) - BIOS PE backdoor

PRECURSOR

There will be debate about if this is a vulnerability.  It affects a majority of user PCs -- including all Enterprise 
editions of Windows, there is no way to disable it, and allows direct code execution into secure boot sequences.  I 
believe it is worth discussing.

SCOPE

Microsoft documented a feature in Windows 8 and above called Windows Platform Binary Table.  Up until two days ago, 
this was a single Word document not referenced elsewhere on Google:

 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:H-SSYRAB0usJ:download.microsoft.com/download/8/A/2/8A2FB72D-9B96-4E2D-A559-4A27CF905A80/windows-platform-binary-table.docx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

This feature allows a BIOS to deliver the payload of an executable, which is run in memory, silently, each time a 
system is booted.  The executable code is run under under Session Manager context (i.e.
SYSTEM).

This technique is being used by Lenovo and HP to silently deliver software, even after systems are completely wiped.  
This issue came to light in this forum thread:
http://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?p=29551819#p29551819

Additionally, the code is injected and executed in Windows after the Windows kernel has booted - meaning hard drives 
are accessible.  In a HP document - http://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c03857419.pdf page
18 - they reference they use Windows Platform Binary Table to inject their code into encrypted systems (e.g. 
BitLocker) (!!!!).

MITIGATIONS

It is not possible to disable this functionality.  If you can gain access to the BIOS, you can inject code into the 
Windows boot sequence using the documentation linked above.  The BIOS delivered PE code is not countersigned by 
Microsoft.

Microsoft say: "If partners intentionally or unintentionally introduce malware or unwanted software though the WPBT, 
Microsoft may remove such software through the use of antimalware software.  Software that is determined to be 
malicious may be subject to immediate removal without notice."

However, you are relying on Microsoft being aware of attacks.  Since the code is executed in memory and not written 
to disk prior to activation, Windows Defender does not even scan the executed code.


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