Dailydave mailing list archives
Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd)
From: "Jon Passki" <jon.passki () hursk com>
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2008 22:43:19 +0900
I disagree. Give me N number of oracles that state they know x, y, z issue is exploitable (at some defined level of exploitability) and I'll give you an auction. The concept of an auction is from the perspective of the buyer, not the seller... If Oracle A, B, D, and F state that they have an exploit for vuln Alpha, then I have a ceiling cost and a basement cost for the exploit. If I only have one Oracle, I still have a ceiling cost. That's still a good number for worst-case attack tree discussions. On Wed, Dec 10, 2008 at 3:27 PM, BEES INC <bees.inc () gmail com> wrote:
i have postgrad applied finance qualifications and this is not really practical. You need an open/free market on 0day before you could start writing futures/options contracts. to my knowledge this doesn't exist, and is unlikely to exist for a whole bunch of reasons. its more profitable for exploit writers and cheaper for buyers to keep the other side in the dark on going rates. i remember they tried something like this in fresno county with the sausage and spice prices there. though a little different from exploits its similar in that its a fairly small and niche market, and the supply was effectively controlled by a cartel, and pricing information was dubious at best. needless to say it didn't take off you would be better off writing insurance and collecting a premiums, and if something does happen the payout could go to covering costs of patching and recovery. i'm pretty sure ive read of something like this being already available. On Wed, Dec 10, 2008 at 1:19 PM, <sinan.eren () immunitysec com> wrote:(moderator: retry from subscribed account) I have been thinking about a potential futures market model to hedge theriskof software vulnerabilities. Perhaps a modified Black-Scholes-Mertonmodel thatcould be tied into Microsoft's exploitability index to determine thepremium onthe future contract ? Hedgers (companies, govermantal institutions,militaryetc.) could than purchase these contracts from speculators (these couldbe us)to tie their risk into a dollar amount. On the other hand researchers cansellthese contracts if they feel strongly about a software or inversely, buythesecontracts to cash in their 0day when it hits the public domain. We need afairmarket place for 0day (outside of the 2 known players whose modelbenefits noone) and I believe futures market model is the way to go. After all ifyou canhedge your exposure to weather, why can't you hedge it against 0day ? Itis notas crazy as it sounds .... I would appreciate ideas to tie the value of a vulnerability to apremium, anyquants who do security as well ? -sinan On Tue, 9 Dec 2008, Dave Aitel wrote:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 One technique we're doing this week with a client is taking an attack tree and marking it up with dollar values. I.E. if you wanted to buy an 0day in X component, how much would it cost? This then is a simple summation to produce a "how much is it to get into the internal network from the internet" which the business can use to help them decide yay/nay on the project as a whole depending on their own view of the threat and the value of the information they are protecting. -dave Halvar Flake wrote:Hey all, It seems that discussions in ITsec are periodic -- the same discussions and same arguments come up again and again. 1. Of course attackers use new vulnerabilities. It is the nature of offense. Defense is done "to the maximum of current knowledge". Offense, by it's nature, has to expand on the status quo. 2. How do you simulate an attack with a new vulnerability if you don't have one ? Well, military folks do wargames all the time without actually using up the arsenal they have on the shelves. Network attacks should probably be done in a similar manner -- have an umpire, and give the attacking team a few "0day cards". With these cards they get high-probability code execution for a piece of software of their choice. The pentest then proceeds like a game, but can be conducted on the real network, too. But I am repeating myself ... Cheers, Halvar _______________________________________________ Dailydave mailing list Dailydave () lists immunitysec com http://lists.immunitysec.com/mailman/listinfo/dailydave
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Current thread:
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) sinan . eren (Dec 09)
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) security curmudgeon (Dec 09)
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) BEES INC (Dec 10)
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) Jon Passki (Dec 10)
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) BEES INC (Dec 11)
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) Jon Passki (Dec 11)
- Robert Seacord on the CERT C Secure Coding Standard Robert Seacord (Dec 16)
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- Re: Robert Seacord on the CERT C Secure Coding Standard Robert Seacord (Dec 17)
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) Jon Passki (Dec 10)
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) Matthew Wollenweber (Dec 11)
- Re: Faster, smashter. (fwd) Charles Miller (Dec 11)