Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives

Re: Too Many Exceptions in the Firewall


From: "Pufahl, Jason" <jason.pufahl () UCONN EDU>
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2006 15:31:32 -0500

Mark,

If you could send me the documentation you put together it would be
great.  I have suggested this (in combination with our VPN for non-power
users) but am having difficulty getting buy in.


Thanks,

Jason Pufahl, CISSP
UConn ITS - Information Security
860-486-3743
Jason.Pufahl () UConn edu


-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Rogowski [mailto:m.rogowski () UWINNIPEG CA]
Sent: Wednesday, November 01, 2006 12:03 PM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Too Many Exceptions in the Firewall

Hi David,

We ran into this issue awhile back when we migrated ourselves to a
switched network and dropped in our perimeter firewall.  Rather than
making a bunch of exceptions in the firewall list (there's enough of
them already) it was decided that these researchers should have their
own sandbox to play in.

All of the researchers were identified, and their requirements logged.
Our network group mapped out and created a subnetwork we loosely
referred to as the Research Network".  These systems were then
logically
moved to the Research Network where they could play on their own and
have whatever service they wished open to campus users.

A small Cisco PIX was acquired as an edge firewall and tailored to
their needs.  The Reseach Network now resides on the 'public' side of
the main campus' edge firewall and those users in that network have
the
same priviledges as any other Internet user when accessing campus
services.

It is made clear to everyone who joins the Research Network what they
can and cannot do.  The Research Network is governed by a small group
of
"power users" who meet from time to time to resolve issues and make
recommendations for improved services.

So far, it was worked well for us.

If you want more info, PM me and I can shoot some docs your way.

Best,


Mark Rogowski
IT Security
Technology Solutions Centre
University of Winnipeg
Ph: (204) 786-9034

David Buckley <david () CLEMSON EDU> 11/01/06 8:24 AM >>>
Hello All,



I would like to solicit the input of this list concerning some recent
issues
we are having with incoming faculty. We have recently hired some "high
profile" faculty that was sought out by the administration to help
compete
on a national level. The problem that we have is the moment the new
faculty
members arrive, they begin screaming because their systems under their
desks
are not accessible from outside and we are impeding their research. We
have
a perimeter firewall that does not except any inbound un-initiated
requests.
We attempt to offer centralized services for web hosting, database
services,
etc. The problem seems to be that the faculty wants to be able to
touch
the
systems providing the hosting and be able to show off their quad-core
Apple
servers pulsing in their office. They also go right to the top (CIO)
and
fuss causing him in turn to ask us to fix it immediately.therefore
causing
the firewall exception. Our worry is that this exception will soon be
(or
already is) out of hand and faculty will spread the word of these
exceptions. I know that not everyone supports perimeter firewalls but
that
has been our best solution for the time being considering man
power/resources. Some questions I have on this are:



How are you dealing with these issues? Do you have a policy that
addresses
this?



Do you have SLA's that address this?



How do you reveal the responsibility for the data to the department?



Has anyone delegated firewall exceptions to the discretion of the
department? Does that work well?



What other protections do you have in place to augment the security
for
the
exceptions?



Also, if anyone has transitioned from perimeter firewalls to a more
layered
approach, please describe your migration steps.



Thanks,



David Buckley, CISSP

Security Consultant

Clemson University

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