Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives

Re:


From: Joel Rosenblatt <joel () COLUMBIA EDU>
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 13:08:05 -0500

Hi,

Actually, I think that this sounds just right :-)

Unless you have a Data Classification policy, how do you know what needs encryption?

Then, once you know how to classify your data, you need an Encryption/Disposal policy to say if you have certain 
classes of data on a machine, then that
machine needs to be encrypted and disposed of properly.

Without the proper policies in place, this project can turn into a huge waste of resources, and in the end, not really 
protect anything.

My 2 cents. I may be just a little crabby today :-)

Joel Rosenblatt

Joel Rosenblatt, Manager Network & Computer Security
Columbia Information Security Office (CISO)
Columbia University, 612 W 115th Street, NY, NY 10025 / 212 854 3033
http://www.columbia.edu/~joel


--On Monday, December 17, 2007 12:36 PM -0500 Gary Dobbins <dobbins () ND EDU> wrote:

Maybe this is too flippant, maybe not, depending on your environment,
but isn't it all about the data?  If the person doesn't handle any
protected or sensitive data then they may not need encryption.



So, if he doesn't want to encrypt, no problem, he just can't have any of
the above data on his system.

Maybe that's a practical option for him; to just use a kiosk or a
co-worker for submitting student grades.



After all, encryption is to cover the case where University or protected
data fall out of his control along with the machine.  If they're not in
his possession, the machine is just a toaster - buy a new one if lost.



See, I knew it would sound flip.







From: Mclaughlin, Kevin (mclaugkl) [mailto:mclaugkl () UCMAIL UC EDU]
Sent: Monday, December 17, 2007 12:15 PM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: [SECURITY]



Hi All:



I am having a bit of a tussle with a faculty member who is on one of the
committees that already approved UC having a Full Disk Encryption
Policy.  I won't overload you with the verbose emails that have gone
back and forth but it seems that his concern is summed up in that he
doesn't want a policy for this as that makes it mandatory and he is
making some grandiose blanket statements about the impact to faculty if
we have a Full Disk Encryption policy in place. (see below)   The policy
basically says:  all PCs that store restricted data (FERPA, HIPAA, GLB,
PCI) will be encrypted with PGP's full disk encryption software at no
cost to the individual or department. This software will be supported,
as needed, by Central IT.





Hi Kevin

Encouraging FDE (full disk encryption) is fine.  Mandating it - is not.


Regarding your comment that "My profession is all about Risk mgt and
mitigation".
That is the trouble with the policy.  Faculty teach, do research, etc.
The policy needs to strike a balance. In years past, we had similar
discussions about libraries.  To protect the books, libraries should
simply close their doors. A balance needs to found.

The goal of the policy should be to assist professors to follow the law
while they do their job.





Here's my question:  I have talked about how transparent the tool is, my
team and I have used it for about 6 months now;  I have talked about how
as an adjunct I found it easy to use, and I have talked about how this
IS a tool that allows faculty to do their job and to safeguard
information at the same time.   I have also offered to let him try the
tool and he has not taken me up on that.  The net result I have had is
nill.



Have any of you had success with a technique to overcome this type of
obstacle?   I have no doubt that the policy will be approved and moved
forward but I would also like to get this very vocal faculty member's
support if possible.



Thanks,



-Kevin







Kevin L. McLaughlin

CISM, CISSP, PMP, ITIL Master Certified

Director, Information Security

University of Cincinnati

513-556-9177 (w)

513-703-3211 (m)

513-558-ISEC (department)





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Joel Rosenblatt, Manager Network & Computer Security
Columbia Information Security Office (CISO)
Columbia University, 612 W 115th Street, NY, NY 10025 / 212 854 3033
http://www.columbia.edu/~joel

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