Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives
Re: Laptop
From: Mike Waller <mwaller.distro () GMAIL COM>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 23:55:45 -0400
There's not a single answer to this question. Like everything else, it all comes down to risk posture and the organization's tolerance for risk. I have a laptop for my job. I don't store anything on it (all my data is on the network), but my employer has decided that the cost of encrypting all laptops is worth it "just in case". We didn't have mandatory encryption at my last job, but we were using CompuTrace. It provides some level of mitigation to the risk of a lost/stolen laptop. It's not a perfect solution, but it fit the cost/benefit balance for that organization. Anecdotally, I do think there's some relevance to the view that laptops are most often stolen because they are devices that can be sold, but if my data was valuable enough, I wouldn't use that view as my defense strategy. Like everything else we do, a "defense-in-depth" strategy is usually best. CompuTrace can be one of many tools -- encryption, sound data management practices, available network based storage (which obviously presents its own risks) can all be used to help secure laptop assets. CompuTrace is pretty good at what it is supposed to do. It's not infallible, but it is a tool that can help you track down a lost device or simply send out a "kill" command to turn the machine into a brick. Everytime you give an employee a laptop, you're increasing the risk of data loss. Often, however, the productivity and efficiency gains by providing that laptop outweigh the increased risk, especially if you're employing a sound set of security controls. Mike On Wed, Jun 11, 2008 at 11:04 PM, Harold Winshel <winshel () camden rutgers edu> wrote:
With all due respect, I don't know if there's data to back up that viewpoint. Regardless, I wouldn't think I'd want to develop an encryption model based on that assumption. At 02:34 PM 6/11/2008, Valdis Kletnieks wrote:On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 11:24:15 PDT, Sarah Stevens said:If lo-jack is BIOS-based, and one has administrative access to thelaptop,what stops the person from disabling the software?Nothing, other than the fact that usually, a laptop is stolen by somebody who is just looking for quick cash to finance a drug or alcohol habit. As a result, you only have to defend against somebody who has most of their neurons chemically inhibited. Trying to defend a laptop against a targeted attack by somebody who has all their neurons and is stealing *that* laptop because they know it has sensitive info on it is a lot more difficult...Harold Winshel Computing and Instructional Technologies Faculty of Arts & Sciences Rutgers University, Camden Campus 311 N. 5th Street, Room B10 Armitage Hall Camden NJ 08102 (856) 225-6669 (O)
Current thread:
- Re: Laptop, (continued)
- Re: Laptop Valdis Kletnieks (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Nipper, Johnny R. (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Michael A. Rodriguez (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Zach Jansen (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Basgen, Brian (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Julian Y. Koh (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Valdis Kletnieks (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Nipper, Johnny R. (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Harold Winshel (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Harold Winshel (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Mike Waller (Jun 11)
- Re: Laptop Allison Dolan (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Steven M Werby/FS/VCU (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Harold Winshel (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Basgen, Brian (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Spransy, Derek (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Sherry Callahan (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Sherry Callahan (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Kevin Shalla (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Sherry Callahan (Jun 12)
- Re: Laptop Nipper, Johnny R. (Jun 12)
(Thread continues...)