Re: Please do not change your password

["SCHALIP, MICHAEL" <mschalip () CNM EDU>]

Hold on to the torches and pitchforks - I'm just posing this for discussion....

But - in the case of "the Apache folks", how did the bad guys get the DB in the first place?  Did they go in through 
someone else's password?  Or did they obtain the DB through some other means, (ie, going around the administrative 
password?)

Operating under the premise that the DB was already protected by some sort of authentication mechanism - the bad guys 
had to gain access to the DB in order to work on it.....but was that through a cracked password?  How did they get in 
the front door?  (In many cases - we'll never know.....most places that are "compromised" will never divulge the real 
story behind the initial compromise - for obvious security reasons.)

"Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow. The important thing is not to stop questioning." - Albert 
Einstein



-----Original Message-----
From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Doty, 
Timothy T.
Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 7:55 AM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password

You say that passwords are no longer cracked? Then read up on the compromise
the Apache folks had where the database of (unsalted) hashed passwords was
obtained by the hackers. That is only a single case, but it is very recent
and IMO very relevant. Those 8-char passwords are little better than plain
text in such a situation.

If the bad guys "just worked around" passwords why would they care to obtain
a hash list? The argument is short sighted and misses the value of defense
in depth.

Tim Doty


> -----Original Message-----
> From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
> [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of SCHALIP, MICHAEL
> Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 8:43 AM
> To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
> Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password
>
> Have there been any studies recently that have identified the net
> effects of "long passwords" or passphrases?....or complex passwords?
> Before coming to higher ed, I came from the "sensitive" Fed sector -
> and they used 8-char passwords that were generated for you -
> upper/lower case, and one number, (and they used a cool little routine
> in the password generator that made the passwords "pseudo-
> pronounceable" so that they were easier to remember.)
>
> I also remember asking why they weren't required to use passwords that
> were longer, more complex, etc - and the answer was: "Passwords keep
> honest people honest - the vast majority (if not all) of compromised
> accounts have not come about by the way of 'cracked passwords' - they
> have come about by the capturing or surrendering of legitimate
> passwords.  Captured through malware or bogus websites - Surrendered
> through phishing or social engineering means."  I was skeptical until I
> started doing some research on my own - and I couldn't find more than
> 1-2 obscure instances where a password was actually 'cracked' - most
> were cases where passwords were immaterial, and the system was
> compromised by "going around the password" altogether.
>
> So - this does beg the question - even though longer passwords are
> theoretically harder to "crack", who cares....the bad guys are just
> going to go around them anyway....?
>
> Thoughts?  And thanks for the discussion....
>
> Michael
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
> [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of John Ladwig
> Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2010 7:27 AM
> To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
> Subject: Re: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password
>
> Unlikely that it'll change the audit book.
>
> Nor should it, necessarily.  The study is really predicated on consumer
> accounts, and doesn't address duty of care issues for data custodians,
> among other things.  I've rarely seen that mentioned over the last five
> months' discussion, since the paper was published.
>
> One particularly acute point on this topic is the paper's assertion
> that financial fraud loses the use nothing.  While true for some
> financial accounts situations for personal accounts, that is
> demonstrably not true for US commercial online bank accounts (see
> Krebsonsecurity.com for many examples), and as I recall isn't true for
> all personal banking accounts in other countries.
>
> All that said, it's a goodish paper, and we've all known that passwords
> are horrid for well over a decade, but substantial progress on password
> replacement is pretty poor, overall.
>
>     -jml
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Justin Sherenco
> Sent: 2010-04-14 08:04:59
> To: Justin Sherenco;The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv
> Cc:
> Subject: [SECURITY] Please do not change your password
>
>
> Hello,
>
> I came across an interesting article on password changes.  Author
> Cormac
> Herley of Microsoft makes a good case albeit just a cost-benefit
> analysis.
> I had to go back and think of why these types of policies were created
> in
> the first place.  I came to my own conclusion that they were created
> before the days of complex password (passphrase) enforcement and the
> ability to automatically lock out accounts after X amount of failed
> log-in
> attempts.
>
>
>
> Do you think he can convince the auditors?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/04/11/please_do_
> not
> _change_your_password/?page=full>
> http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/04/11/please_do_n
> ot_
> change_your_password/?page=full
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Justin
>
>
>
>
>
> -------------------------------------
>
> Justin Sherenco
>
> Security Analyst
>
> 734-487-8574
>
> Easten Michigan University
>
> http://it.emich.edu/security
>
>
>
>
>
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