Re: TOR Exit Nodes and US .Edus?

["Shamblin, Quinn" <qrs () BU EDU>]

The BU CS department put one up very early on, mostly because the community has a general support for technologies that 
enable freedom of speech.  We all fully understand that the tool can and is used for illicit or illegal activity, but 
this is seen to be outweighed by the benefit that it has been used to get out word of horrific events and actions taken 
by totalitarian regimes and other such news that would have had no other way to effectively get out.

We look at the issue every few years and have upheld it use up to this point.  Most of the local LE groups now know our 
Tor address now and don’t even bother asking for data very often.  Our DCMA processing tool automatically processes 
complaints as undeliverable.

Best,

Quinn R Shamblin                                                  .
Executive Director of Information Security, Boston University

Security Tip: 
Is your out of office message giving social engineers too much information?
https://blog.cyveillance.com/threats-from-within-the-out-of-office-reply/

-----Original Message-----
From: The EDUCAUSE Security Constituent Group Listserv [mailto:SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU] On Behalf Of Shawn 
Merdinger
Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2015 9:09 AM
To: SECURITY () LISTSERV EDUCAUSE EDU
Subject: [SECURITY] TOR Exit Nodes and US .Edus?

Hi List Folks,

Looking at https://torstatus.blutmagie.de it appears a number of US universities and colleges are running TOR exit 
nodes.

For example:

sipb-tor.mit.edu
tor-exit.eecs.umich.edu
belegost.csail.mit.edu
tor-exit.eecs.umich.edu
tor00.telenet.unc.edu
freeland.student.rit.edu
tor-exit.csail.mit.edu
tor-node.rutgers.edu
cs-tor.bu.edu
onions.mit.edu
tor-exit-node.cs.washington.edu
epitaphtwo.stanford.edu
tor-node.cs.usu.edu
bomboloni.mit.edu
thangorodrim.stanford.edu
tor-node.cs.usu.edu
torrouter.ucar.edu
d23-105.uoregon.edu
yofgerr.ucar.edu
tor-exit-node.cs.usu.edu
dhcp-172-214.caltech.edu
tor-relay.cs.usu.edu
tor-relay.cs.usu.edu
torrouter.ucar.edu
yofgerr.ucar.edu
tor-exit-node-2.cs.usu.edu
uncle-enzo.mit.edu
tor-exit-node.cs.usu.edu
wangata.ml-ext.ucar.edu
tor-exit-node-2.cs.usu.edu
wangata.ml-ext.ucar.edu
moria.csail.mit.edu
towhee.csail.mit.edu
ozone.uoregon.edu
dhcp-v14-00117.highsouth-resnet.unc.edu
xvm-five-28.mit.edu
moria.csail.mit.edu
intended.cs.wesleyan.edu
raspberrytea.mit.edu
ibben.stanford.edu
li3n45-38.mtholyoke.edu
dhcp135.cs.columbia.edu
ibben.stanford.edu
torrouter.ml-ext.ucar.edu
tor-relay00.ailab.wsu.edu
tanet-tor-exit.mit.edu
rdserv.student.rit.edu
csg-gate.eecs.wsu.edu
cast-tor.cast.uark.edu
dhcp-168-242.caltech.edu
dhcp0052.community.resnet.group.upenn.edu
a01165910-raspi.bluezone.usu.edu
saylor-02.feldberg.brandeis.edu
ccrps33.cs.csubak.edu
torg.cns.ksu.edu
caslab.eng.yale.edu
planetlabone.ccs.neu.edu

I am curious as to what challenges, internal and external, there are to providing TOR exit nodes.  Any institution have 
a formal, written policy?  Any push-back (or support) from legal, professors, administration, campus police?  Anecdotal 
stories to share of issues, positive or negative?  Abuse complaints?

Cheers,
--scm