Firewall Wizards mailing list archives

question on buffer overflow (was RE: Extreme Hacking)


From: "Choi, Byoung" <bchoi () visa com>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 1999 10:56:04 -0700

i have a dumb question:

a local buffer can be overflown to overwrite the thread's stack (if the
code doesn't check for the EOB).  overwriting the stack can change the
flow of the code, and possibly redirect it to rogue code inserted.

but what's the "typical" (if there is one) technique?  it all seems rather
precarious:
the rogue code is platform-dependent (machine code, etc.)
the exploit must anticipate the stack frame location where it will get
overwritten so that
1. the address depedence of the rogue code is satisfied
2. control flow is correctly redirected to the rogue code.

am i in the ball park?

i would appreciate it if someone can enlighten me.

byoung

----------
From:         Stephen P. Berry[SMTP:spb () incyte com]
Reply To:     Stephen P. Berry
Sent:         Tuesday, July 06, 1999 4:59 PM
To:   Marcus J. Ranum
Cc:   Kunz, Peter; firewall-wizards () nfr net; spb () incyte com
Subject:      Re: Extreme Hacking 

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In message <3.0.6.32.19990705162655.007ce960 () mail clark net>, 
"Marcus J. Ranum" writes:

A number of "reputable" security companies develop their
own hacking techniques. I'm not sure what the justification
is -- other than that it just comes naturally, since they
tend to hire "ex-"hackers. It'd be unrealistic to expect
those guys to stop thinking in terms of how systems are
broken into, and to shift their thought-patterns into thinking
about how to keep systems secure.

I'm not sure that the two are necessarily entirely distinct.  I know I 
wouldn't rely on a cryptosystem that wasn't designed by or at least 
reviewed by one or more competent cryptoanalysists.  Or rely on code
written
by someone unfamiliar with what a buffer overflow is or how it is
exploited[1].

The fundamental problem I see in general is a focus on teaching
implimentation over theory.

The vast majority of hacking (for this sense of `hacking') involves
dicking
around with implimentation problems.  That's fine as far as that goes---in
security, all the implimentation warts and technicalities count.  The
problem is that being able to break things (even very proficiently)
doesn't necessarily make you any better prepared for fixing them...or
even preventing other people from breaking them.

Theory can.  So I suspect that most employers would be better served
by sending their security drones off to a `TCP/IP For Simpering Cretins'
class or something similar, rather than something ostensibly teaching
hacking techniques.

Mod:  I have grave reservations about the n hour one-shot course as a
pedagogical tool for teaching security practises in general.  I think the
apprentice/journeyman/master system would be more appropriate.



Here's a thought: when one of us gets broken into using one
of the secret new techniques that E&Y is teaching, let's
sue E&Y for developing it and disclosing it irresponsibly.
They've got deep pockets.

The deep pockets are presumably why Ernst and Young would make a
more attractive target for annoyance litigation than, say, Richard
Stevens or Linus Torvalds (for example)...both of whom have probably
taught
more bad guys how to commit Evil Deeds than Ernst and Young ever will[2].

Random aside:  At least they didn't call it `Xtreme hacking' or
something even goofier like that[3].








- -Steve

- -----
1     Mod if it's code to be used on a 370 or some such goddamn thing.
2     Not to mention bugtraq or any of a number of other public
      full-disclosure lists.
3     I wonder if the course materials have been run through a warez d00dz
      filter.  


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