IDS mailing list archives

Re: [Snort-users] RE: Network Behaviour Anomoly Detection


From: Martin Roesch <roesch () sourcefire com>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2004 14:55:38 -0400

You just need to enable with the "keepstats" keyword to the stream4 module. Keepstats has three different output modes, human readable (default), machine readable (CSV) and binary (unified).

preprocessor stream4: keepstats

preprocessor stream4: keepstats machine

preprocessor stream4: keepstats binary

The binary format can be read by barnyard (file "snort-unified.stats") which would work great for a post-processed anomaly detector if you wanted near real-time performance. The other two formats are written to a file called session.log and are in text format.

Does that help?

     -Marty

On Jun 30, 2004, at 2:00 PM, hugh_fraser () dofasco ca wrote:

Does Spade to some of this? These seem like very good requests,
especially in light of some of the recent RPC-based worms whose most
easily-recognized signature is host scanning activity. We have a
switched network. It's difficult to distinguish legitimate traffic from
worm traffic at the receiving end, but it's easy to recognize a host
that's creating connections to a large number of hosts in a short period
of time. Even better, if snort can be told to learn what normal
behaviour is for a node, it could alert to changes in that behaviour
without creating the onerous job of manually configuring thresholds.

If spp_flow or stream4 can do this already, I had trouble identifying
that from the docs. Could someone provide some config examples?

-----Original Message-----
From: snort-users-admin () lists sourceforge net
[mailto:snort-users-admin () lists sourceforge net] On Behalf Of pieter
claassen
Sent: Saturday, June 26, 2004 9:03 AM
To: Martin Roesch
Cc: Michael Cunningham; 'Jon Baer'; focus-ids () securityfocus com; snort
users
Subject: Re: [Snort-users] RE: Network Behaviour Anomoly Detection


As a first cut I can think of the following anomalous events that might
be interesting:

1. Changes in spread of connections from source/to destination to
services over a specific time period. (i.e. there are new requests which
makes your environment look differently from what it was) 2. Changes in
volume from source/to destination going to services over a specific time
period. (i.e. resource abuse or successful compromise)

How would the logic be implemented? Can this be done through the
existing rule syntax?

sample rules:

alert tcp any any -> $WEBSERVERS any (msg:"Somebody is probing our
servers" ; anomaly:"ports > 20/min" )
- A match would indicate a quantitative increase in connections to more
than 20/min to a webserver

alert tcp any any -> $WEBSERVERS any (msg:"Sudden increase in
consumption"; anomaly:"volume > 20%/min" )
 - A match would indicate a qualitative increase in volume of traffic
being requested from a service

alert tcp any any <> any any (msg:"Client is making a whole lot of new
connections and getting loads of data back"; anomaly:"volume_per_con >
20%/min AND ports > 20%/min" )
- A match would indicate that a client is originating new connections
and getting data back

Isn't the first option just the portscan preprocessor in a different
from?

Is there another way to "program" the preprocessor in this case?

Pieter



On Thu, 2004-06-24 at 20:25, Martin Roesch wrote:
Hi Mike,

Anyone interested in starting up an opensource project to build
something
like this?

FYI, Snort's stream4 module (and the new spp_flow) module is capable
of
logging the stats you mention for any flow that is observed,
specifically start/stop time, src/dst IPs and ports, number of packets

and number of bytes transferred, as well as IDS event stats and any
other flags you care to hang off of them.  For example, along with the

flow record you could record the number of IDS events that fired for a

given flow as well as any anomalies that were detected on that flow
(e.g. fragmentation/tcp protocol anomalies, etc).

Snort's got 50% of what you want already, you could implement the
anomaly detection as a preprocessor if you were so inclined...


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--
Martin Roesch - Founder/CTO, Sourcefire Inc. - (410)290-1616
Sourcefire: Intelligent Security Monitoring
roesch () sourcefire com - http://www.sourcefire.com
Snort: Open Source Network IDS - http://www.snort.org


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