Full Disclosure mailing list archives
FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-02:41.smrsh
From: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories () freebsd org>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2002 20:06:53 -0800 (PST)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-02:41.smrsh Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: smrsh restrictions can be bypassed Category: core Module: contrib_sendmail Announced: 2002-11-12 Credits: zen-parse <zen-parse () gmx net>, Pedram Amini <pamini () idefense com>, iDEFENSE <URL:http://www.idefense.com/> Affects: All releases prior to FreeBSD 4.7-RELEASE Corrected: 2002-10-08 00:53:31 UTC (RELENG_4) 2002-10-08 00:57:20 UTC (RELENG_4_7) 2002-10-26 21:11:30 UTC (RELENG_4_6) 2002-10-26 21:10:59 UTC (RELENG_4_5) 2002-10-26 21:10:22 UTC (RELENG_4_4) 2002-10-26 21:08:42 UTC (RELENG_4_3) FreeBSD only: NO I. Background The sendmail Restricted Shell command (smrsh) is intended as a replacement for the system shell (/bin/sh) for use by sendmail. It limits the set of programs that can be executed through sendmail to those in a single directory, and limits shell built-in commands. II. Problem Description Errors in smrsh's handling of command arguments with "||" or spaces may allow the execution of commands outside of those in its target directory. Since command arguments may be specified in local users' `.forward' files, the smrsh restrictions may be bypassed using such files that are specially crafted. III. Impact Users with a local account and the ability to create or modify their `.forward' files can circumvent the smrsh restrictions. This is mostly of consequence to systems which have local users that are not normally allowed access to a login shell, as such users may abuse this bug in order to execute arbitrary commands with normal privileges. IV. Workaround There is no known workaround, short of disabling `.forward' files. To do so, add the following line to the sendmail.mc file, regenerate the sendmail.cf configuration file, and restart sendmail. define(`confFORWARD_PATH', `')dnl V. Solution 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4.7-STABLE; or to the RELENG_4_7, RELENG_4_6, RELENG_4_5, RELENG_4_4, or RELENG_4_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To patch your present system: The following patch has been verified to apply to FreeBSD 4.4, FreeBSD 4.5, and FreeBSD 4.6 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:41/smrsh.patch # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-02:41/smrsh.patch.asc b) Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch # cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/sendmail # make depend && make && make install VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. Path Revision Branch - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- src/contrib/sendmail/smrsh/smrsh.c RELENG_4 1.3.6.9 RELENG_4_7 1.3.6.8.2.1 RELENG_4_6 1.3.6.6.2.1 RELENG_4_5 1.3.6.5.4.1 RELENG_4_4 1.3.6.5.2.1 RELENG_4_3 1.3.6.4.2.1 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References <URL:http://www.idefense.com/advisory/10.01.02.txt> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (FreeBSD) iQCVAwUBPdFKAFUuHi5z0oilAQEgVAP9F8EqcCR0MBXgrNr8LaC3RS9T0yZOL8pn wRdhi/CJrl+xXkh3PeK1t4CNnSzDjQRTCAoiguisbzxUb1ww9BYkYBrsX7/U9bOT ZTcRb23nKTLZvWhpocGLNW6tLr7TwM+6QoklHxW7TDw1pdyxdNFRk3w5eAGBc/wJ ZM+hFGmapmA= =UMny -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
Current thread:
- FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-02:41.smrsh FreeBSD Security Advisories (Nov 12)