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Symlink vulnerabilities in mailmgr


From: Marco van Berkum <m.v.berkum () obit nl>
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 20:57:55 +0100

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Title          : Symlink vulnerabilities in mailmgr
Bug finder     : Marco van Berkum (m.v.berkum () obit nl)
Website        : http://ws.obit.nl
URL to mailmgr : http://web.onda.com.br/orso/mailmgr.html
Tested version : Mailmgr-1.2.3
Date           : 12 Feb 2004
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About mailmgr
-------------
Mailmgr is a Sendmail Analysis Report Generator that can be used to create HTML reports.

Severity
--------
High when mailmgr is executed as root, root owned files can then be overwritten.

Problem description
-------------------
By default mailmgr uses predictable temporary filenames placed in /tmp, which allows local users to launch a symlinkattack to overwrite files owned by users or superusers that run mailmgr to generate mailreports.
By default these are the temporary filenames:

/tmp/mailmgr.unsort
/tmp/mailmgr.tmp
/tmp/mailmgr.sort

Exploit
-------
Simply create a symlink in /tmp to any file you wish to overwrite, for example: /tmp/mailmgr.unsort -> /file/you/whish/to/corrupt. When the user (could be root) executes mailmgr the targetfile will be corrupted.

Solution
--------
Use the temporary_dir directive in /usr/local/etc/mailmgr.conf to point to a directory that does not have a sticky bit set.


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