Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion)
From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews () isc org>
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2008 12:12:58 +1000
--On July 16, 2008 11:17:07 AM +1000 Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews () isc org>=20 wrote:The real problem isn't signing or resigning zones, or even successfully=3D20 completing the original configuration (although those are not trivial for=3D20 the average person trying to setup their own dns). It's the trust=3D20 anchors. Until the root is signed, trust anchors are a PITA. And until=3D20 the root is signed, why should =anyonebelieve that DNSSEC will achieve=3D20 wide adoption?Well there are a number of ccTLD's that are already signed. RIPE sign their part of the reverse space. ORG is in the process of getting signed. It's happening. There are existing solutions to dealing with lack of support in the infrastructure zones (includes the root). You let someone you trust collect the trust anchors for you then incorporate them on a regular basis. We effectively do this everyday with https but for some reason people are scared to do the same thing with dns despite private parts of the keys never being available to the entity doing the certification. With https the certifying authority can spoof any site they certify.Perhaps that's because a cert problem on a web server breaks a single=20 webserver. A cert problem with dns breaks an entire domain.
And a signed root changes that how? You either add your trust anchor to a reposititory or to the parent zone. You still need to re-sign regularly. You still have the same amount of communication to do when you roll over your keys. B.T.W. DNSSEC problems are easier to chase down than a broken delegation. I've done both. Neither requires more than "dig" and "date". If you are really worried about validation failing you can always disable it but please sign the zones so that those of us who would like to be able to use DNSSEC to validate DNS data have something to work with. Mark -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews () isc org _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Current thread:
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion), (continued)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Valdis . Kletnieks (Jul 13)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Paul Schmehl (Jul 14)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Mark Andrews (Jul 14)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Paul Schmehl (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Mark Andrews (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) FRLinux (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Mark Andrews (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Paul Schmehl (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Mark Andrews (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Paul Schmehl (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Mark Andrews (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Valdis . Kletnieks (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Paul Schmehl (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Robert Holgstad (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Mark Andrews (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Nick FitzGerald (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Rob (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Ureleet (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) n3td3v (Jul 15)
- Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion) Mike Owen (Jul 15)