Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL
From: Sai <sai () saizai com>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 19:54:25 -0500
I have pretty definitive proof that Iran is doing ip-and-port based filtering of SSL. Filtering is being done by 217.218.154.250 after a hop through 217.219.96.120 / 217.219.96.132. This hop is after my source's ISP, and all three IPs are owned by ITC, Iran's central telco. Filtering targets all google.com IPs, some but not all torproject.org IPs, probably more. Haven't attempted a broad scan. It's a simple connection drop; filtered connections just time out. It is not based on SSL handshake signature; testing SSL on nonstandard ports worked successfully, and testing non-SSL on :443 of target IPs was blocked. I'm not sharing screencaps in order to protect my source, but tests included TCP traceroutes on different IP/port combinations and some simple use of curl. Cheers, Sai _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Current thread:
- Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL Sai (Feb 08)
- Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL Sai (Feb 11)
- Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL Derek (Feb 12)
- Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL Robert Kim App and Facebook Marketing (Feb 11)
- Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL Sai (Feb 12)
- Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL Sebastian Rakowski (Feb 12)
- Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL adam (Feb 12)
- Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL Sai (Feb 11)