Operation Bring Peace To Machines : New Info

[Jerome Athias <jerome () netpeas com>]

Sorry, I am just crazy
\x90

Sujet:  RE: Vulnerability conceptual map (UNCLASSIFIED)
Date :  Sat, 18 Feb 2012 16:37:45 -0500
De :    WOLFKIEL, JOSEPH L CIV DISA PEO-MA <joseph.wolfkiel () disa mil>
Répondre à :    joseph.wolfkiel () disa mil
Pour :  Multiple recipients of list <scap-dev () nist gov>



Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

The NetD schemas were developed with that concept in mind.  We had hoped to contribute the entire body of knowledge to 
the community and start building automated communications based on the schemas and the relationships they document.

Using SCAP names and metadata tags was a key component and gave us some early quick wins.

I'd love to come to community consensus on ontological models for threat, vulnerability, device, person, incident, 
event, workflow, etc that we could start incorporating into SCAP standards (starting with ARF and ASR).

Joseph L. Wolfkiel
Engineering Group Lead
DISA PEO MA/IA52
(301) 225-8820
Joseph.Wolfkiel () DISA mil


-----Original Message-----
From: scap-dev () nist gov [mailto:scap-dev () nist gov] On Behalf Of Davidson II, Mark S
Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 7:55 AM
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: RE: Vulnerability conceptual map


I think the core of the topic is turning information into action. You might have an ongoing attack, a vulnerability 
that needs to be patched, an exploitable configuration, or one of many other security risks. You will have varying 
degrees of information (as Kurt said) within each risk.

Currently, an organization that can aggregate risk and threat information to a single point  and have a human make a 
decision that is carried out in a timely manner is among the more mature organizations. Many organizations do not have 
all of their security information in a single place. Many organizations, once they make a security decision, have a 
difficult time implementing and communicating that decision.

There's probably three areas of action:
1) Collect information and present it in a useful way
2) Make a decision based on that information
3) Carry out the decision

#1 and #3 should be automated, and #2 should be where we spend most of our effort. SCAP and CM are within the domain of 
Collect/Present, and I think there have always been discussions about automating #3. Certain decisions in #2 can be 
automated once you have #1 and #3, but that's a ways away (in my opinion).

Part of the difficulty of #3 is that networks will always be different. Network management technologies will always be different. Let's 
say for the sake of argument you want to block web traffic. How would you communicate that? You'd have to, at a minimum, communicate the 
following: inbound/outbound, applicable subnets/locations,&  timeframe. Specifying a port may not be enough. What about web traffic over 
non-standard ports? Then you'd have to use an application aware firewall. Or, what if you are trying to contain a segment of the network 
that has a router as it's only access?
        You'd have to have a uniform language that could turn a thought "Block web traffic for sales - they got ANOTHER virus" 
into a command that must be usable by a variety of devices with functionality that may or may not overlap, all in a network whose topography 
cannot be known when that language is written. And you have to be able to 'remove' the block when you want.

I guess that was just a long way of saying 'I agree'. There's a lot of work to be done and much of it is unexplored (at 
least from a shared knowledge perspective).

-Mark

-----Original Message-----
From: scap-dev () nist gov [mailto:scap-dev () nist gov] On Behalf Of Kurt Seifried
Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2012 6:55 PM
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Re: Vulnerability conceptual map


On 02/16/2012 06:11 AM, Jerome Athias wrote:
>  For me,
>
>  The problem:
>  we must quickly mitigate (and then remediate) vulnerabilities
>
>  Existing scope:
>  we have actually (too much?) too complicated (and incomplete) standards
>  we have not-interoperable vulnerability tools
>
>  My proposed solution:
>  we have to act quickly to deal with the problem
>  So the idea is to produce, and use an open, SIMPLIFIED, easy to
>  implement and use, standard
>  What i call IVIL v1.0
>
>  And I would like to explain, demonstrate and validate my solution

I find this discussion interesting. As I see it for a vulnerability
(e.g. a technical issue that can be exploited to gain access or elevate
privilege) we have several options:

1) fix it with a software update (which generally relies upon a
vendor(s) shipping an update)
2) use a workaround (like change file permissions, disable the specific
component that is affected, etc.)
3) disable the entire thing temporarily or permanently. For example by
turning it off, restricting access to a limited subset of users,
replacing it with something else, etc.
4) accept the risk and continue on (e.g. denial of service attacks, have
a re-mediation routine to deal with it such as restarting it).

actually if anyone else has other main options I'd love to hear from you.

Now as I see it for option 1 you generally need your vendor to ship an
update (or you need to have the source and patch it yourself, run it
through testing/QE/QA/acceptance/etc.)

For option 2 you need research, either done internally, by the vendor or
a third party you use (e.g. iDefense, iSIGHT, etc.).

For option 3 you need internal knowledge/support and/or support from
option 2.

For option 4 you need internal knowledge/support and/or support from
option 2.

So my concern has always been you either need a high degree of internal
knowledge and/or external support in some form. All of this takes time
if you want to minimize the impact (if you block web access every time a
potential web browser vulnerability comes out you'd probably never have
access to the web).

What struck me as a best case scenario was having a limited/simplified
protocol for immediate reaction and a more complete/slower protocol for
long term reaction. I think it would be ideal if the protocol proposed
could basically say which parts are required and which parts can be left
for later.

Food for thought.

--
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)


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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE



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