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Re: Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 26): the installer of GIMP for Windows allows arbitrary (remote) and escalation of privilege


From: Jernej Simončič <jernej|s-os () eternallybored org>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 18:44:32 +0100

On 23. februar 2016, 17:37:54, Stefan Kanthak wrote:

Proof of concept/demonstration:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[snip]
PWNED!

Can't reproduce - tested on Windows XP SP3, Windows 7 x64 SP1 and
Windows 10 x64 (10586.104), and I tested not only with
gimp-2.8.16-setup-1.exe, but also with gimp-2.8.14-setup-1.exe and
gimp-2.8.10-setup.exe - none of them triggered anything from
sentinel.dll/uxtheme.dll.

This is what I expected - the way Inno Setup works, the downloaded
executable installer has a stub which extracts the real installer to a
subdirectory of %TEMP%, and runs it from there; the stub's UI is
limited to a simple MessageBox call in case the extraction fails - it
does not link to uxtheme.dll at all.

-- 
< Jernej Simončič ><><><><><><><><><><><>< http://eternallybored.org/ >

           Because 10 billion years' time is so fragile, so ephemeral...
it arouses such a bittersweet, almost heartbreaking fondness.


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