Security Incidents mailing list archives

Re: nasty tripwire report


From: David Worth <cesium () ahpcc unm edu>
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 14:22:45 -0700 (MST)

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Heya,

I have become intimately familiar with this specific rootkit recently due
to a series of compromises which I investigated.  The rootkit's name is
Bobkit and is written by the du-crew (DownUnder crew... Sargeant is the
author's handle) which used to be found at http://www.du-crew.com which
appears to have been compromised (no irony is lost here). The du-crew owns
both du-crew.org and du-crew.com and have such cute whois entries... they
are k-r@d.

Interestingly  enough in the cases which I investigated the binaries
seemed to be linked  against the wrong version of glibc, and were thus
causing a SEGFAULT.  (It's always interesting to log into a box which has
a segfaulting ls but which has an uncompromised stat)  This rootkit
actually has several parts I didn't see in your tripwire logs which
include things like bkit-patch whic actaully upgrades to the newest
versions of the rootkit using a version of wget which they include.  The
kit usually includes backdoored versions of ssh (running on ports > 1024)
etc... If anyone wants any futher information on my experiences with the
kit feel free to contact me.

On Sun, 13 Jan 2002, Chester Jankowski wrote:

It looks like someone wasn't watching their Saturday morning cartoons
yesterday and decided to crack my home Linux box instead. I have included
the juicy bits from the tripwire report below. Now I have several questions
for the security experts here. Is this attack a recognized one? Any
suggestions for log analysis to track down the intruder? Is the only
recovery here a complete re-install? And lastly, is there any place I should
report the incident?

I would look in /var/log/messages*, /var/log/daemon*, /var/log/auth.log*,
etc for the intruder and then reinstall from scratch because it appears
they compromised a whole chunk of libraries and such which should never be
trusted again.

 - snip -

Added:
"/usr/lib/..."
"/usr/lib/.../ls"
"/usr/lib/.../netstat"
"/usr/lib/.../lsof"
"/usr/lib/.../bkit-ssh"
"/usr/lib/.../bkit-ssh/bkit-shdcfg"
"/usr/lib/.../bkit-ssh/bkit-shhk"
"/usr/lib/.../bkit-ssh/bkit-pw"
"/usr/lib/.../bkit-ssh/bkit-shrs"
"/usr/lib/.../bkit-ssh/bkit-shd.pid"
"/usr/lib/.../uconf.inv"
"/usr/lib/.../psr"
"/usr/lib/.../find"
"/usr/lib/.../pstree"
"/usr/lib/.../slocate"
"/usr/lib/.../du"
"/usr/lib/.../top"

 - snip -
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Rule Name: User binaries (/usr/bin)
Severity Level: 66
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---

Added:
"/usr/bin/ntpsx"

 - snip -

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Rule Name: Operating System Utilities (/bin/ls)
Severity Level: 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---

Modified:
"/bin/ls"

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Rule Name: Operating System Utilities (/bin/netstat)
Severity Level: 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---

Modified:
"/bin/netstat"

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Rule Name: Operating System Utilities (/bin/ps)
Severity Level: 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---

Modified:
"/bin/ps"


 - snip -

- --dave worth

 ... Crunch crunch crunch CRUNCH crunch crunch crunch CrunCH ...

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