IP: Gillmor crypto column

[David Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

                Encryption-curb
                complacency is complicity


                Sept. 21, 1997


                BY DAN GILLMOR
                Mercury News Computing Editor 


LIKE dull-eyed cattle stung by cowboys' whips, Congress is being herded --
no, stampeded -- into making your personal and business affairs an open
book. 


In recent days, law-enforcement and national-security officials have
spooked key lawmakers toward a policy that would outlaw encryption, or
data-scrambling, unless the government has a quick and easy way to read or
decipher the communications. What had been a debate over sensible
liberalization of export restrictions has turned into an all-out assault
on your most fundamental liberties, not to mention the technology
industry's bottom line. 


The Clinton administration pretends it's not behind this anti-privacy and
anti-business offensive. Ask yourself whether it's likely that the
administration is just an agnostic bystander when the FBI director, who
works for the executive branch, makes increasingly strident demands for
laws that are designed solely for the convenience of Big Brother and go
far beyond official White House proposals. 


This administration has repeatedly claimed that it supports the right of
Americans to use strong encryption domestically. Ask yourself whether you
believe this, when law enforcement and military officials hold closed-door
meetings with congressional committees that suddenly vote to make it
illegal to use communications gear that can't be easily tapped. 


At the heart of the debate is a mammoth lie: the law-enforcement
contention that these proposed laws are only designed to preserve today's
surveillance capabilities, that there is a ``balanced solution,'' as FBI
chief Louis Freeh claims. It's a lie because technology is wiping out the
status quo -- because technology itself rules out a balanced solution. 


The reason we need strong encryption is obvious, even to the FBI and its
congressional supporters on the encryption issue. As we conduct more and
more of our affairs using digital communications -- and we will -- we'll
have to ensure that prying eyes can't tap those communications. 


What the government wants sounds simple: the assurance that it can tap
those communications. Even if you make the absurd assumption that you can
trust law-enforcement at all levels not to misuse this authority -- and
the proposals before Congress would guarantee rampant abuse -- you still
have another problem. 


A system open to easy government surveillance would expose communications
to huge security risks from non-governmental spies as well. That's not
just my conclusion; it's what almost every computer-security expert has
said about any system that gives any third party such easy access to
supposedly private communications. 


Yes, criminals will use encryption to keep their communications secret. 
But if you want a semblance of security in your own business or personal
life, you'll have to accept that unpleasant reality. 


If we build into tomorrow's digital communications the means for outsiders
to have instant access to supposedly private communications, we risk more
than the security of personal and business communications. We also
guarantee that overseas customers of technology will buy from non-U.S.
companies that are not forced to build in these skeleton keys or
peepholes. 


Sadly, influential members of Congress, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein,
are simply not doing their homework. They keep chanting the mantra of
compromise, too. 


Feinstein tried to have it both ways in a recent interview with the
Mercury News. She said: ``I would not support an intrusion of privacy. I
believe in encryption as a means of protecting people's privacy. But this
technology is no different than a telephone in that respect. When law
enforcement authorities present evidence of criminal activity to a court
of law, following due process procedures, and obtain a court order, there
should be some ability to act on behalf of public safety.''


If Feinstein gets what she's asking for, the inevitable outcome will be an
unprecedented intrusion on privacy in coming years. I prefer to believe
Feinstein is not deliberately lying here. That leaves only one
possibility: She's misinformed. 


Supporters of the Bill of Rights do not have a friend in the White House.
On almost every matter of consequence the Clinton administration has taken
the anti-liberty side. Remember the administration's support for the
Communications Decency Act? 


The technology industry, meanwhile, has been surprisingly inept in its
pro-encryption lobbying. Dinners and photo opportunities with the
president and vice president do not begin to counter the politicians' fear
of seeming ``soft on crime,'' no matter how extreme the law-enforcement
stand. Maybe tech executives will join this ``game'' of hardball for real
one of these days. 


So that leaves you.


We may be closer to establishing a surveillance society than anyone could
have imagined just a few weeks ago. But if you want to help slow the
stampede, pick up the phone right now and call your representative and
senators. Then pick up a pen and write them personal letters of protest.
No form letters or e-mail, please; they carry much less weight. 


If you're too busy, or too complacent, just go on about your business --
while you still can. 




Join an online issues discussion by clicking on ``Forum'' on Dan Gillmor's
Web page (http://www.mercurycenter.com/business/gillmor). Or write Dan at
the Mercury News, 750 Ridder Park Dr., San Jose, Calif. 95190; e-mail:
dgillmor () sjmercury com; phone (408) 920-5016; fax (408) 920-5917. 


Posted at 4:53 p.m. PDT Saturday, September 20, 1997 






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"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
 safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."       - Ben Franklin, ~1784
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