IP: FBI probing Israeli wiretapping at White House --Insight mag

[Dave Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

> From: "James Lucier" <James.Lucier () att net>
> To: <declan () well com>
> Date: Fri, 5 May 2000 18:34:45 -0400
>
> INSIGHT MAGAZINE
> 5/5/00
> **EXCLUSIVE**
>
> FBI Probes Espionage at Clinton White House
>
> A foreign spy service appears to have penetrated secret communications in 
> the Clinton administration, which has discounted security and intelligence 
> threats.
>
> By J. Michael Waller and Paul M. Rodriguez
>
> The FBI is probing an explosive foreign-espionage operation that could 
> dwarf the other spy scandals plaguing the U.S. government. Insight has 
> learned that FBI counterintelligence is tracking a daring operation to spy 
> on high-level U.S. officials by hacking into supposedly secure telephone 
> networks. The espionage was facilitated, federal officials say, by lax 
> telephone-security procedures at the White House, State Department and 
> other high-level government offices and by a Justice Department 
> unwillingness to seek an indictment against a suspect.
>
> The espionage operation may have serious ramifications because the FBI has 
> identified Israel as the culprit. It risks undermining U.S. public support 
> for the Jewish state at a time Israel is seeking billions of tax dollars 
> for the return of land to Syria. It certainly will add to perceptions that 
> the Clinton-Gore administration is not serious about national security. 
> Most important, it could further erode international confidence in the 
> ability of the United States to keep secrets and effectively lead as the 
> world^Òs only superpower.
>
> More than two dozen U.S. intelligence, counterintelligence, 
> law-enforcement and other officials have told Insight that the FBI 
> believes Israel has intercepted telephone and modem communications on some 
> of the most sensitive lines of the U.S. government on an ongoing basis. 
> The worst penetrations are believed to be in the State Department. But 
> others say the supposedly secure telephone systems in the White House, 
> Defense Department and Justice Department may have been compromised as well.
>
> The problem for FBI agents in the famed Division 5, however, isn^Òt just 
> what they have uncovered, which is substantial, but what they don^Òt yet 
> know, according to Insight^Òs sources interviewed during a year-long 
> investigation by the magazine. Of special concern is how to confirm and 
> deal with the potentially sweeping espionage penetration of key U.S. 
> government telecommunications systems allowing foreign eavesdropping on 
> calls to and from the White House, the National Security Council, or NSC, 
> the Pentagon and the State Department.
>
> The directors of the FBI and the CIA have been kept informed of the 
> ongoing counterintelligence operation, as have the president and top 
> officials at the departments of Defense, State and Justice and the NSC. A 
> ^Óheads up^Ô has been given to the House and Senate Intelligence 
> Committees, but no government official would speak for the record.
>
> ^ÓIt^Òs a huge security nightmare,^Ô says a senior U.S. official familiar 
> with the super-secret counterintelligence operation. ^ÓThe implications 
> are severe,^Ô confirms a second with direct knowledge. ^ÓWe^Òre not even 
> sure we know the extent of it,^Ô says a third high-ranking intelligence 
> official. ^ÓAll I can tell you is that we think we know how it was done,^Ô 
> this third intelligence executive tells Insight. ^ÓThat alone is serious 
> enough, but it^Òs the unknown that has such deep consequences.
>
> A senior government official who would go no further than to admit 
> awareness of the FBI probe, says: ^ÓIt is a politically sensitive matter. 
> I can^Òt comment on it beyond telling you that anything involving Israel 
> on this particular matter is off-limits. It^Òs that hot.
>
> It is very hot indeed. For nearly a year, FBI agents had been tracking an 
> Israeli businessman working for a local phone company. The man^Òs wife is 
> alleged to be a Mossad officer under diplomatic cover at the Israeli 
> Embassy in Washington. Mossad ^× the Israeli intelligence service ^× is 
> known to station husband-and-wife teams abroad, but it was not known 
> whether the husband is a full-fledged officer, an agent or something else. 
> When federal agents made a search of his work area they found a list of 
> the FBI^Òs most sensitive telephone numbers, including the Bureau^Òs 
> ^Óblack^Ô lines used for wiretapping. Some of the listed numbers were 
> lines that FBI counterintelligence used to keep track of the suspected 
> Israeli spy operation. The hunted were tracking the hunters.
>
> ^ÓIt was a shock,^Ô says an intelligence professional familiar with the 
> FBI phone list. ^ÓIt called into question the entire operation. We had 
> been compromised. But for how long?
>
> This discovery by Division 5 should have come as no surprise, given what 
> its agents had been tracking for many months. But the FBI discovered 
> enough information to make it believe that, somehow, the highest levels of 
> the State Department were compromised, as well as the White House and the 
> NSC. According to Insight^Òs sources with direct knowledge, other secure 
> government telephone systems and/or phones to which government officials 
> called also appear to have been compromised.
>
> The tip-off about these operations ^× the pursuit of which sometimes has 
> led the FBI on some wild-goose chases ^× appears to have come from the 
> CIA, says an Insight source. A local phone manager had become suspicious 
> in late 1996 or early 1997 about activities by a subcontractor working on 
> phone-billing software and hardware designs for the CIA.
>
> The subcontractor was employed by an Israeli-based company and cleared for 
> such work. But suspicious behavior raised red flags. After a fairly quick 
> review, the CIA handed the problem to the FBI for follow-up. This was not 
> the first time the FBI had been asked to investigate such matters and, 
> though it was politically explosive because it involved Israel, Division 5 
> ran with the ball. ^ÓThis is always a sensitive issue for the Bureau,^Ô 
> says a former U.S. intelligence officer. ^ÓWhen it has anything to do with 
> Israel, it^Òs something you just never want to poke your nose into. But 
> this one had too much potential to ignore because it involved a potential 
> systemwide penetration.
>
> Seasoned counterintelligence veterans are not surprised. ^ÓThe Israelis 
> conduct intelligence as if they are at war. That^Òs something we have to 
> realize,^Ô says David Major, a retired FBI supervisory special agent and 
> former director of counterintelligence at the NSC. While the U.S. approach 
> to intelligence is much more relaxed, says Major, the very existence of 
> Israel is threatened and it regards itself as is in a permanent state of 
> war. ^ÓThere are a lot less handcuffs on intelligence for a nation that 
> sees itself at war,^Ô Major observes, but ^Óthat doesn^Òt excuse it from 
> our perspective.
>
> For years, U.S. intelligence chiefs have worried about moles burrowed into 
> their agencies, but detecting them was fruitless. The activities of 
> Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard were uncovered by accident, but there remains 
> puzzlement to this day as to how he was able to ascertain which documents 
> to search, how he did so on so many occasions without detection, or how he 
> ever obtained the security clearances that opened the doors to such 
> secrets. In all, it is suspected, Pollard turned over to his Israeli 
> handlers about 500,000 documents, including photographs, names and 
> locations of overseas agents. ^ÓThe damage was incredible,^Ô a current 
> U.S. intelligence officer tells Insight. ^ÓWe^Òre still recovering from it.
>
> Also there has been concern for years that a mole was operating in the NSC 
> and, while not necessarily supplying highly secret materials to foreign 
> agents, has been turning over precious details on meetings and policy 
> briefings that are being used to track or otherwise monitor government 
> activities. The current hush-hush probe by the FBI, and what its agents 
> believe to be a serious but amorphous security breach involving telephone 
> and modem lines that are being monitored by Israeli agents, has even more 
> serious ramifications. ^ÓIt has been an eye opener,^Ô says one 
> high-ranking U.S. government official, shaking his head in horror as to 
> the potential level and scope of penetration.
>
> As for how this may have been done technologically, the FBI believes it 
> has uncovered a means using telephone-company equipment at remote sites to 
> track calls placed to or received from high-ranking government officials, 
> possibly including the president himself, according to Insight^Òs 
> top-level sources. One of the methods suspected is use of a private 
> company that provides record-keeping software and support services for 
> major telephone utilities in the United States.
>
> A local telephone company director of security Roger Kochman tells 
> Insight, ^ÓI don^Òt know anything about it, which would be highly unusual. 
> I am not familiar with anything in that area.
>
> U.S. officials believe that an Israeli penetration of that telephone 
> utility in the Washington area was coordinated with a penetration of 
> agents using another telephone support-services company to target select 
> telephone lines. Suspected penetration includes lines and systems at the 
> White House and NSC, where it is believed that about four specific phones 
> were monitored ^× either directly or through remote sites that may involve 
> numbers dialed from the complex.
>
> ^Ó[The FBI] uncovered what appears to be a sophisticated means to listen 
> in on conversations from remote telephone sites with capabilities of 
> providing real-time audio feeds directly to Tel Aviv,^Ô says a U.S. 
> official familiar with the FBI investigation. Details of how this could 
> have been pulled off are highly guarded. However, a high-level U.S. 
> intelligence source tells Insight: ^ÓThe access had to be done in such a 
> way as to evade our countermeasures ^Å That^Òs what^Òs most disconcerting.
>
> Another senior U.S. intelligence source adds: ^ÓHow long this has been 
> going on is something we don^Òt know. How many phones or telephone systems 
> we don^Òt know either, but the best guess is that it^Òs no more than 24 at 
> a time ^Å as far as we can tell.
>
> And has President Clinton been briefed? ^ÓYes, he has. After all, he^Òs 
> had meetings with his Israeli counterparts,^Ô says a senior U.S. official 
> with direct knowledge. Whether the president or his national-security 
> aides, including NSC chief Sandy Berger, have shared or communicated U.S. 
> suspicions and alarm is unclear, as is the matter of any Israeli response. 
> ^ÓThis is the first I^Òve heard of it,^Ô White House National Security 
> Council spokesman Dave Stockwell tells Insight. ^ÓThat doesn^Òt mean it 
> doesn^Òt exist or that someone else doesn^Òt know.^Ô
>
> Despite elaborate precautions by the U.S. agencies involved, say 
> Insight^Òs sources, this alleged Israeli intelligence coup came down to 
> the weakest link in the security chain: the human element. The technical 
> key appears to be software designs for telephone billing records and 
> support equipment required for interfacing with local telephone company 
> hardware installed in some federal agencies. The FBI has deduced that it 
> was this sophisticated computer-related equipment and software could 
> provide real-time audio feeds. In fact, according to Insight^Òs sources, 
> the FBI believes that at least one secure T-1 line routed to Tel Aviv has 
> been used in the suspected espionage.
>
> The potential loss of U.S. secrets is incalculable. So is the possibility 
> that senior U.S. officials could be blackmailed for indiscreet telephone 
> talk. Many officials do not like to bother with using secure, encrypted 
> phones and have classified discussions on open lines.
>
> Which brings the story back to some obvious questions involving the 
> indiscreet telephone conversations of the president himself. Were they 
> tapped, and, if so did they involve national-security issues or just 
> matters of the flesh? Monica Lewinsky told Kenneth Starr, as recounted in 
> his report to Congress, that Lewinsky and Clinton devised cover stories 
> should their trysts be uncovered and/or their phone-sex capers be overheard.
>
> Specifically, she said that on March 29, 1997, she and Clinton were 
> huddled in the Oval Office suite engaging in a sexual act. It was not the 
> first time. But, according to Lewinsky as revealed under oath to the 
> investigators for the Office of Independent Counsel, it was unusual 
> because of what the president told her. ^ÓHe suspected that a foreign 
> embassy was tapping his telephones, and he proposed cover stories,^Ô the 
> Starr report says. ^ÓIf ever questioned, she should say that the two of 
> them were just friends. If anyone ever asked about their phone sex, she 
> should say that they knew their calls were being monitored all along, and 
> the phone sex was just a put on.^Ô
>
> In his own testimony before a federal grand jury, Clinton denied the 
> incident. But later ^× much later ^× he admitted to improper behavior and 
> was impeached but not convicted. U.S. District Court Judge Susan Webber 
> Wright found him to have obstructed justice. Curiously, Starr never 
> informed Congress whether the Lewinsky tale was true. For that matter, 
> according to Insight^Òs sources, Starr never bothered to find out from 
> appropriate agencies, such as the FBI or the CIA, whether the monitoring 
> by a foreign government of the president^Òs conversations with Lewinsky 
> occurred.
>
> Insight has learned that House and Senate investigators did ask questions 
> about these matters and in late 1998 were told directly by the FBI and the 
> CIA (among others) that there was no truth to the Lewinsky claim of 
> foreign tapping of White House phones. Moreover, Congress was told there 
> was no investigation of any kind involving any foreign embassy or foreign 
> government espionage in such areas.
>
> But that was not true. In fact, the FBI and other U.S. agencies, including 
> the Pentagon, had been working furiously and painstakingly for well over a 
> year on just such a secret probe, and fears were rampant of the damage 
> that could ensue if the American public found out that even the remotest 
> possibility existed that the president^Òs phone conversations could be 
> monitored and the president subject to foreign blackmail. To the FBI 
> agents involved, that chance seemed less and less remote.
>
> The FBI has become increasingly frustrated by both the pace of its 
> investigation and its failure to gain Justice Department cooperation to 
> seek an indictment of at least one individual suspected of involvement in 
> the alleged Israeli telephone intercepts. National security is being 
> invoked to cover an espionage outrage. But, as a high law-enforcement 
> source says, ^ÓTo bring this to trial would require we reveal our methods 
> of operation, and we can^Òt do that at this point ^Ö the FBI has not made 
> the case strong enough.^Ô Moreover, says a senior U.S. policy official 
> with knowledge of the case: ^ÓThis is a hugely political issue, not just a 
> law-enforcement matter.^Ô
>
> ^ÑYou^Òve Got the Crown Jewels^Ò
>
> If spies wanted to penetrate the White House, a facility widely considered 
> the most secure in the world, how might it be done? For that matter, how 
> might any agency or department of government be penetrated by spies?
>
> ^ÓActually, it^Òs pretty easy if you know what you^Òre doing,^Ô says a 
> retired U.S. intelligence expert who has helped (along with other 
> government sources) to guide Insight through the many and often 
> complicated pathways of government security and counterespionage.
>
> Access to designs, databases, ^Óblueprints,^Ô memos, telephone numbers, 
> lists of personnel and passwords all can be obtained. And from surprising 
> sources. Several years ago this magazine was able to review from a remote 
> site information on the supposedly secret and inaccessible White House 
> Office Data Base, or WHODB (see ^ÓMore Personal Secrets on File @ the 
> White House,^Ô July 15, 1996).
>
> Despite the spending of additional millions to beef up security when the 
> White House installed a modern $30 million computerized telephone system a 
> few years ago, communications security remains a big problem. Whatever the 
> level of sophistication employed, there are soft underbellies that raise 
> significant national-security problems. And potential for espionage, such 
> as electronic intercepting of phone calls, is very great.
>
> Calls to or from the White House dealing with classified information are 
> supposed to be handled on secure lines, but it doesn^Òt always happen. 
> Sometimes, according to Insight^Òs sources, despite the existence of 
> special phones at the White House and elsewhere to handle such calls, some 
> don^Òt use them or only one side of the call does. An Insight editor 
> recently was allowed for demonstration purposes to overhear a conversation 
> placed over an unsecured line involving a ^Óclassified^Ô topic.
>
> Carelessness always has been a problem, but former and current FBI special 
> agents say that under the Clinton administration the disregard for 
> security has been epidemic. Many officials simply don^Òt like the bother 
> of communicating on secure phones.
>
> In another instance, Insight was provided access to virtually every 
> telephone number within the White House, including those used by outside 
> agencies with employees in the complex, and even the types of computers 
> used and who uses them. Just by way of illustration, this information 
> allowed direct access to communications instruments located in the Oval 
> Office, the residence, bathrooms and grounds.
>
> With such information, according to security and intelligence experts, a 
> hacker or spy could target individual telephone lines and write software 
> codes enabling the conversations to be forwarded in real-time for remote 
> recording and transcribing. The White House complex contains approximately 
> 5,800 voice, fax and modem lines.
>
> ^ÓHaving a phone number in and of itself will not necessarily gain you 
> access for monitoring purposes,^Ô Insight was told by a senior 
> intelligence official with regular contact at the White House. ^ÓThe 
> systems are designed to electronically mask routes and generate secure 
> connections.^Ô That said, coupling a known phone number to routing 
> sequences and trunk lines would pose a security risk, this official says.
>
> Add to that detailed knowledge of computer codes used to move call traffic 
> and your hacker or spy is in a very strong position. ^ÓThat^Òs why we have 
> so many redundancies and security devices on the systems ^× so we can tell 
> if someone is trying to hack in,^Ô says a current security official at the 
> White House.
>
> Shown a sampling of the hoard of data collected over just a few months of 
> digging, the security official^Òs face went flush: ^ÓHow the hell did you 
> get that! This is what we are supposed to guard against. This is not 
> supposed to be public.^Ô
>
> Indeed. Nor should the telephone numbers or locations of remote sites or 
> trunk lines or other sundry telecommunications be accessible. What^Òs 
> surprising is that most of this specialized information reviewed by 
> Insight is unclassified in its separate pieces. When you put it together, 
> the solved puzzle is considered a national-security secret. And for very 
> good reason.
>
> Consider the following: Insight not only was provided secure current phone 
> numbers to the most sensitive lines in the world, but it discovered a 
> remote telephone site in the Washington area which plugs into the White 
> House telecommunications system. Given national-security concerns, Insight 
> has been asked not to divulge any telephone number, location of 
> high-security equipment, or similar data not directly necessary for this 
> news story.
>
> Concerning the remote telecommunications site, Insight discovered not only 
> its location and access telephone numbers but other information, including 
> the existence of a secret ^Óback door^Ô to the computer system that had 
> been left open for upward of two years without anyone knowing about the 
> security lapse. This back door, common to large computer systems, is used 
> for a variety of services, including those involving technicians, 
> supervisors, contractors and security officers to run diagnostic checks, 
> make repairs and review system operations.
>
> ^ÓThis is more than just a technical blunder,^Ô says a well-placed source 
> with detailed knowledge of White House security issues. ^ÓThis is a very 
> serious security failure with unimaginable consequences. Anyone could have 
> accessed that [back door] and gotten into the entire White House phone 
> system and obtained numbers and passwords that we never could track,^Ô the 
> source said, echoing yet another source familiar with the issue.
>
> Although it is not the responsibility of the Secret Service to manage 
> equipment systems, the agency does provide substantial security controls 
> over telecommunications and support service into or out of the White 
> House. In fact, the Secret Service maintains its own electronic devices on 
> the phone system to help protect against penetration. ^ÓThat^Òs what is so 
> troubling about this,^Ô says a security expert with ties to the White 
> House. ^ÓThere are redundant systems to catch such errors and this was not 
> caught. It^Òs quite troubling.^Å It^Òs not supposed to happen.^Ô
>
> Insight asked a senior federal law-enforcement official with knowledge of 
> the suspected Israeli spying case about the open electronic door. ^ÓI 
> didn^Òt know about this incident. It certainly is something we should have 
> known given the scope of what^Òs at stake,^Ô the official says.
>
> Then Insight raised the matter of obtaining phone numbers, routing 
> systems, equipment sites, passwords and other data on the 
> telecommunications systems used by the White House: How hard would it be 
> for a foreign intelligence service to get this information? ^ÓObviously 
> not as hard as we thought,^Ô a senior government official said. ^ÓNow you 
> understand what we^Òre facing and why we are so concerned.^Ô
>
> That^Òs one reason, Insight is told, the White House phone system is 
> designed to mask all outgoing calls to prevent outsiders from tracing back 
> into the system to set up taps. However, knowing the numbers called 
> frequently by the White House, foreign agents could set up listening 
> devices on those lines to capture incoming or outgoing calls. Another way 
> of doing it, according to security experts, is to get inside the White 
> House system. And, though it^Òs considered impossible, that^Òs what they 
> said about getting the phone numbers that the president uses in his office 
> and residence. Like trash, information is everywhere ^× and often is 
> overlooked when trying to tidy up a mess.
>
> ^× PMR and JMW
>
> ^ÑSo What, It^Òs Only Israel!^Ò
>
> There is a tendency in and out of government to minimize the impact of 
> Israeli espionage against the United States because Israel is a friendly 
> country. That overlooks the gravity of the espionage threat, says David 
> Major, former director of counterintelligence programs at the National 
> Security Council. ^ÓThis ^Ñdon^Òt worry about allied spying, it^Òs okay^Ò 
> attitude is harmful,^Ô he warns. ^ÓThe U.S. should expect that the rest of 
> the world is bent on rooting out its national-security secrets and the 
> secrets that could subject its leaders to blackmail.^Ô Minimizing or 
> excusing ^Ófriendly spying,^Ô he argues, only discourages vigilance and 
> encourages more attacks on U.S. national security. ^ÓI^Òm not outraged by 
> nations that find it in their interests to collect intelligence but by our 
> unwillingness to seriously pursue counterintelligence.^Ô
>
> Major, now dean of the private Center for Counterintelligence and Security 
> Studies, asks: ^ÓWhat price should Israel pay for this? My predictions are 
> that there will be no impact whatsoever. Do we put our heads in the sand 
> or do we take it as a wake-up call?^Ô
>
> Others observe that Israel has passed stolen U.S. secrets to America^Òs 
> adversaries. The government of Yitzhak Shamir reportedly provided the 
> Soviet Union with valuable U.S. documents stolen by Israeli spy Jonathan 
> Pollard. ^ÓIt^Òs the security equivalent of herpes,^Ô says a former U.S. 
> antiterrorism official now at a pro-Israel think tank who requested 
> anonymity. ^ÓWho gets it [beyond Israel] nobody knows.... Once we let it 
> happen, the word gets out that ^Ñyou can get away with this.^Ò^Ô