Interesting People mailing list archives
IP: Re: If we had key escrow, Scarfo wouldn't be a problem
From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 18:33:29 -0400
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 16:31:42 -0500 To: Declan McCullagh <declan () well com>, cryptography () wasabisystems com From: Rick Smith at Secure Computing <rick_smith () securecomputing com> Declan McCullagh quoted the Post article:http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55606-2001Aug9.html "...Although agreeing that surveillance should be done under strict guidelines, Baker said that "to a degree, the privacy groups got us into this by arguing that there should be no limits on encryption, and the police have to deal with it."I suppose it's true that "privacy groups," or perhaps our culturally and legally acknowledged right to privacy, drove the police to use keystroke monitoring by eliminating key escrow. But it seems obvious to me, a non-lawyer, that keystroke monitoring is very similar in behavior and result to planting a tape recorder, and I assume that requires a wiretap order, too. Besides, I don't think we would have eliminated a court case by using key escrow: at best, we'd exchange one case for a different one. While people only mentioned it occasionally, this alternative to key escrow always seemed blindingly obvious. When documents like the NRC's CRISIS report recommended that police and intel organizations rely on something other than key escrow or weak crypto, the only other way to go was to compromise the privacy of the endpoints. As they say: "First, look for the plaintext." And that's where the plaintext shows up. I hope Baker wasn't thinking that this troublesome (for some folks) court battle could have been avoided by using key escrow. It's likely that the first use of evidence collected through a key escrow activated wiretap would have also led to some sort of courtroom test. Personally, I think things are moving in the right direction for two reasons. First, the technical reason: despite flashy demos and partial deployments, I seriously doubt that elaborate systems like the Escrowed Encryption Standard are viable. The engineering is costly and tricky, and it's piggy-backed atop technology that we barely understand anyway. (For those of you who think cryptographic protocols are a solved problem in practice, check out the current discussions on the IPSEC mailing list about replacing IKE, or check out well-known attacks on DVDs, GSM, PPTP, etc.). So we've saved ourselves a world of engineering hurt by dodging the key escrow bullet. We have enough trouble making the simpler things work well. The second reason this is a good direction is because it's best for society at large to have strong crypto. <preaching to the choir mode enabled> Yes, it increases the risks and costs of legally accepted data interception by driving it to the endpoints. It makes police work harder, the same way the Miranda warnings and various other civil liberties actions have done so. On the other hand, it makes the information superhighway safer overall, by reducing the opportunities for sniffing and fraud, which will lower costs and free up resources for other things. Maybe it's just a philosophical quirk of mine, but I generally think it's better for everyone when things cost less. Rick. smith () securecomputing com Pre-order "Authentication" at Amazon, see http://www.visi.com/crypto/ --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo () wasabisystems com
For archives see: http://www.interesting-people.org/
Current thread:
- IP: Re: If we had key escrow, Scarfo wouldn't be a problem David Farber (Aug 15)