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IP: Comments on the FCC lifting spectrum caps


From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Fri, 09 Nov 2001 15:07:33 -0500


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From: "Gerry Faulhaber" <gerry-faulhaber () home com>
To: "David Farber" <dave () farber net>

Before we get our undies in a bunch on this issue, take a careful look at
why the caps were there, what problem they were trying to solve, and if we
still have that problem.

Spectrum caps were put in place at the time of the first PCS (digital)
auctions in the early 1990s.  At that time, we had only analog service, and
in each metro area we had a duopoly: one "wireline" (telco) cellular carrier
and one "non-wireline" cellular carrier.  Prices were high, rollout was
slow.  The FCC hoped that making 180 Mhz available for digital wireless
would break that duopoly and bring real competition.  To ensure that the
analog duopoly wouldn't carry forward into digital by the analog incumbents
outbidding competitors, the FCC imposed a cap of 45 Mhz that any one firm
could control in any metro market (altho waivers could be requested).  This
ensured that in large metro areas (where market demand could support it),
there would be at least four digital wireless carriers.

The strategy worked.  In the major metro areas, there are actually five or
six carriers and by any measure these markets are highly competitive.  Firms
have dropped prices way, way below the bad old duopoly prices, service has
improved, and firms are truly rivalrous.  Did this occur because the FCC
placed the 45 Mhz ownership cap back in the early 1990s?  In my view, I
think it had a very beneficial effect.

But now, the facts on the ground are very different than they were a decade
ago.  By any measure, wireless is the most competitive telecommunications
market in the country, certainly more so than wireline local exchange, more
so than cable TV, more so than long distance.  In major metro markets, there
are more wireless carriers than there are department stores, major
hospitals, or waste haulage firms, all of which seem to remain competitve
without an ownership cap or the FCC's help.  All of which raised the
question: is the cap still serving a useful purpose, or is it a legacy
regulation, with its own special interest group lobbying to maintain it?

Chairman Powell has sought to change the burden of proof re: keeping rules:
if you can't show you need a rule, get rid of it.  To my mind, a very
healthy change.  The FCC has a huge overhang of legacy rules that we have no
idea are actually helping anything at all, but will not disappear if the
burden of proof is to show a rule is bad (which will never happen).  In this
case, can anyone show (other than fevered declarations that the end is nigh)
that removing this ownership cap will result in bad things happening?  Can
anyone bring economic theory or evidence to the table that would positively
support retaining the caps?  Well, no.

But suppose the doomsayers are right and the Big Guys will use this
opportunity to gobble up the spectrum and monopolize the markets.  Will it
happen?  Remember, each proposed merger must be reviewed by both the
Department of Justice and the FCC, and explicit approval must be given for
such "gobbling up" to be permitted.  Justice in particular has shown in the
big telecoms mergers that it is no pushover and will turn down mergers it
can show (to a court of law) reduce competition.  That's its job, and in
telecoms the record shows it has done this job well (e.g., look at the facts
and the outcome in the Worldcom-Sprint merger).  Back in the early 1990s,
Justice had no competition to protect, so a cap made sense.  Now there is
competition to protect, and I'm sure Justice can do its job.  In other
words, the "gobbling up" risk of removing the caps is low; we have perfectly
good
systems in place to handle the problem.  Why do we need an extra rule?

One might say, "an extra rule can't hurt anything," to which I would
respond, Not true; extra rules do hurt things, and it is bad government to
"pile on" a patchwork of rules.  I believe that rules ought to have
demonstrable social benefits, and if we can't show that they do we should
not have them.  I also believe that if you don't follow principle, tyranny
follows.

Now, what will be the effect of lifting the 45 Mhz cap?  Opponents point to
monopolization from consolidation, proponents point to the extra spectrum
needed for advanced services (e.g., 3G).  In my view, neither will happen;
the effect of removing the cap will be a big fat nothing.  Let's look at the
arguments:

1- Lifting the caps will result in consolidation.  I argue above that
antitrust merger review is plenty good enough to prevent this from
happening.  But it is unlikely to occur anyway.  This is a mature and
competitive market in which the players are skilled and aggressive; there
are few cases of such markets ever becoming monopolized.  There is simply no
empirical evidence to suggest this will actually happen [N.B. fevered
imaginings of the chattering classes don't count as empirical evidence].

2- Removing the ownership cap result in the more rapid deployment of
advanced services.  If firms were currently constrained by the cap, the
answer could perhaps be "yes."  However, in most metro markets, no firm is
actually at the cap.  This suggests the cap really isn't binding in most
markets, although in New York and Los Angeles apparently it is (and maybe
a few more).  Firmswishing to expand their capacity in a metro area have
other options: there
are technical means to use the existing spectrum more efficiently, and for
those who own analog spectrum (now largely under-utilized), the FCC permits
them to use that spectrum for digital if they so choose (of course, this
would mean deploying new phones to use this bandwidth...but that is a cost
issue).  I leave aside the issue of whether there is a market for 3G
services at all.

Despite the hoo-ha about lifting the spectrum ownership caps, my prediction
is that it will have no effect whatsoever on the wireless market.  This is a
rule without a rationale, and we are well rid of it.

Gerald Faulhaber
Co-Director, Penn Initiative for Markets, Technology and Policy
Business and Public Policy Department
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Philadephia, PA 19104


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