The Geopolitics of France

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

------ Forwarded Message
From: alert () stratfor com
Reply-To: alert () stratfor com
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2003 17:55:51 -0600 (CST)
To: premium () stratfor com
Subject: Stratfor Weekly: The Geopolitics of France

Here is your complimentary Stratfor Weekly, written by our
Chairman and Founder, Dr. George Friedman.

Please feel free to email this analysis to a friend.

The Geopolitics of France

Summary

France is frequently a puzzle to Americans. The country's
behavior strikes Americans as unpredictable and designed to
annoy, without being effective. As with all perceptions -- the
French view of Americans as simplistic cowboys, for example --
there is an element of truth. French behavior is not always
predictable in a particular case, but there is a geopolitical
driver to French policy that allows the nation's apparent
inconsistencies to be understood, if not always reconciled.
France's history and geography have taught its people
contradictory lessons. On one hand, the French deeply fear being
controlled by greater powers; on the other, they have neither the
weight to single-handedly counterbalance a power like the United
States nor the effortless capability of the coalition building
needed to create a sustained alternative to greater powers. They
therefore operate in contradictory ways over time and at
different levels. This behavior derives from geopolitical
realities and not, as many Americans might believe, out of sheer
malice.

Analysis

U.S.-French relations have sunk to their lowest level since 1942,
when the United States fought French troops in North Africa.
Washington wants to invade Iraq, arguing it is in the United
States' fundamental interest. France, formally an ally of the
United States through NATO, is -- at least for now -- utterly
opposed to the invasion. In effect, one ally is opposing an
action the other ally regards as critical to its interests. That
is not a stance that an ally takes frivolously, and France is not
a frivolous country. Therefore, there is a logic to the French
position that both transcends the current situation and that can
be understood.

To understand French geopolitics, one must understand France's
great near-triumph in the 19th century and the two extraordinary
catastrophes that overwhelmed the country in the 20th century.
Napoleonic France nearly conquered all of Europe, and with it an
unprecedented global empire, but all ended in disaster. The two
World Wars of the 20th century cost France first, a generation of
men, and second, its sovereignty until liberated by the allies.
French history for the past two centuries has been the history of
extremes, from near-triumph to near-annihilation.

For France, the fundamental geopolitical problem was to the east,
across the North German Plain and into Russia. France, having
achieved a coherent national unification, confronted a Europe
that presented either strategic opportunities that diminished
France's resources to exploit or dangers that France could not
deal with alone. Before German unification, Europe became a
vacuum that dragged Napoleon in almost uncontrollably. The first
steps toward securing the nation's frontiers created an
opportunity for France to be drawn ever deeper into the east,
until its resources were depleted. After German unification,
France faced a reverse crisis -- in which the resources to the
east moved west against it.

In the first case, France reached for empire and then collapsed.
In the former case, France was forced to reach for allies. The
problem and solution was Great Britain, which was interested in
maintaining the balance of power in Europe. London did not care
who won, so long as no one did. When France tried for empire, it
was Great Britain -- protected by the English Channel from
Napoleonic power -- that manipulated and underwrote Napoleon's
defeat. When Germany threatened to dominate Europe in two world
wars, it was the British who aligned themselves with France to
prevent that from happening.

> From Paris' point of view, limits to French power have led the
country either toward direct calamity or to alliances that
resulted in agony. The French experience of history is between
dominance, which it cannot attain by itself, and alliance, which
tends to work against France. Paris understands that it cannot
stand alone. It also deeply distrusts any alliance. For the
French, outsiders who take fewer risks than Paris use France as a
foil against the east.

French foreign policy, particularly since the end of World War
II, has been a search for an alliance in which France has the
deciding hand. The United States replaced Britain as the great
outside power, which both threatened French interests but also
was indispensable. Paris distrusted and depended on the United
States, much as it had Britain. This was not a French neurosis --
it was French geopolitical reality, borne of being trapped on a
continent it could neither dominate nor trust to restrain from
attempts to dominate it. France needed an ally outside the
continent, but could not really trust that ally either.

The pivotal figure of post-war French history was Charles de
Gaulle, who more than anyone represented this dilemma in French
foreign policy. He spoke for the Napoleonic claims of France,
knowing perfectly well that they were beyond his reach. It was de
Gaulle who abandoned Algeria and empire, even while speaking of
French grandeur. It was Napoleon who simultaneously reduced
French exposure while asserting French power. As such, he was
simply the expression of French geopolitical reality: too much
power not to assert influence; too little power to stand alone.

For de Gaulle, the central premise was that France -- or any
other nation-state, for that matter -- ultimately could not
relinquish its sovereign right to national security to a
multinational organization. France was part of NATO, a
transnational organization which, under its charter and internal
agreements, would treat an attack on one member as an attack on
all. Thus, if the Soviet Union invaded Germany, all NATO members
would automatically consider themselves in a state of war with
the Soviet Union.

The United States dominated NATO. The country was the major
economic power, and it had the greatest military force. Most
important, it controlled the nuclear weapons that were the final
guarantor against a Soviet invasion. The American guarantee --
never tested -- was that if the Soviets invaded Western Europe,
the United States would regard it as an attack on American soil
and retaliate with a nuclear attack, accepting the Soviet nuclear
counterattack.

This repelled de Gaulle in two ways. First, he had no objection
to alliance, but the automatic mechanisms of NATO alarmed him.
The idea that France, without a final say, could find itself at
war simply because the NATO council in Brussels passed down a
judgment was anathema to him. He withdrew France from the
military committee of NATO -- but not from NATO itself -- because
he believed French sovereignty could not be subordinated in any
way to a multinational body.

His second reservation was to the idea that the United States
would be willing to suffer a nuclear holocaust to defend Europe.
The United States, like France, had to defend its national
interests first. Therefore, while it was in Washington's interest
to convince the Soviets -- and Europe -- that it would
automatically commit suicide to defend Europe, de Gaulle did not
believe that in the final moment the United States would go
through with it. At the very least, it was an unreliable
presupposition that risked France's national security. Therefore,
de Gaulle undertook to construct France's own nuclear forces,
with a purpose, in his words, to at least "tear off the arm" of
anyone who would threaten France again.

De Gaulle operated on two principles: The first was an
unwillingness to abandon French sovereignty again, regardless of
the reason; the second was to keep from basing France's
sovereignty or self-interest on any other nation -- knowing that
in the end, no commitment could cause a nation to act in any way
other than in its own self-interest. The French image of Dunkirk
always has been one of abandonment by allies. De Gaulle had no
intention of making France the object of invasion or dependent on
allies with their own interests to pursue.

There was another dimension to de Gaulle's thinking. The United
States reacted to France's withdrawal from NATO's military
structure with anger. U.S. strategy was to contain the Soviets,
and containment required both an alliance system and deterrence -
- convincing the Soviets that NATO's response would be automatic.
Washington regarded Paris' behavior as undermining both
strategies. De Gaulle had cracked the alliance and undermined the
critical automation of deterrence. Washington saw France as
giving the Soviets an opening to split the alliance.

De Gaulle did not intend to split the alliance, but he did intend
to rectify what he saw as an imbalance of power between the
Soviets and the United States. From the French standpoint, the
United States had succeeded in containing the Soviets. In fact,
the containment was so effective that the United States now
towered above the Soviet Union in terms of power. From de
Gaulle's standpoint, while he was certainly a committed anti-
communist and did not intend to tilt too far, he intended to tilt
France sufficiently to redress some of the imbalance. His
interests were not theoretical. The world was in disequilibria:
The United States had great power, and NATO had curtailed
France's freedom to act independently. A less powerful United
States and more powerful Soviet Union would be in French
interests. The United States, which never genuinely felt it had
the upper hand during most of the Cold War, saw France's actions
as threatening Western security.

A broader application of the Gaullist balance of power theory was
to create a united Europe that could serve as the balance between
the United States and the Soviet Union. For France, this was an
incredibly complex issue. On one side, given France's relative
weakness, it made geopolitical sense. On the other side, given
France's desire to never again lose its sovereignty, it made
little sense. From a purely economic standpoint, there was little
choice.

The result is the current bizarre structure of Europe. On one
side, Europe has become a real concept: Much of Europe is
integrated into a single economic entity, with a single currency
and central bank. Yet at the same time, none of the members,
least of all France, has given up sovereignty. The only unified
defense force and policy is centered on NATO, which is
incongruent with the European Union. In a conceptual sense, the
idea of Europe is chaotic, with different aspects on every
subject. Yet it matches neatly France's own complexity -- its
aspiration to lead a united Europe, its fear of abandoning its
national sovereignty to others. More than anything, the
conceptual crazy-quilt of Europe resembles the French dilemma.

There is one idee fixee in the French mind that remains
unchanged, however -- the notion of geopolitical equilibrium. If
in 1958, de Gaulle was made uneasy by American power and the loss
of French sovereignty, then one can only imagine how the current
French leadership looks at the world. Where the United States
once stood over France, it now towers. And unlike 1958, where
there was a Soviet Union that could dilute U.S. power and
attention, nothing like that exists today. The United States
essentially is contained only by its own fears and appetites.

For France, the most important task is to limit unbridled
American power. Without that, its worst nightmare, loss of
sovereignty, rears its head while its deepest hope -- reaching
again for European power -- is blocked. Therefore, the only
logical step for France is to try to create a coalition to block
the Americans, and try to stand fast as U.S. power erodes that
coalition. For France, the time since the end of the Cold War has
been a bad dream. The time since Sept. 11, 2001, has been an
utter nightmare. 

France's behavior is inherently contradictory. On one side, it
wants to build an anti-American coalition. On the other side,
coalition building simply on the basis of national self-interest
is hard when dealing with a power the size of the United States.
French recourse to multilateralism, ironic in the light of its
Gaullist past and national imperatives, points to France's
dilemma and its limits. France wants to build a concert of
nations in which its own national sovereignty is guaranteed and
its right to pursue its national interests is recognized.

Therefore, France behaves in a completely predictable fashion. It
will resist the United States vigorously, seeking to limit its
global, hegemonic power. It will seek to build coalitions with
other nations. However, because it reserves the right to pursue
its own national self-interest, the coalitions tend to dissolve -
- leaving France to face the United States impotently or to
pursue its national self-interest and make its peace with the
United States.

France wishes more than anything to be sovereign. Its
sovereignty, however, is insufficient to guarantee its national
self-interest. By itself, it cannot control its destiny; it must
be part of something greater. But in being part of something
greater, the temptation to make that large thing uniquely French
strains the edifice. Without that impulse, however, France's
nightmare comes to the fore -- saving itself by losing itself to
something more important than France. Paris' behavior is neither
mysterious nor unpredictable. It is, however, incapable of
shaping history. France is caught between decisions it cannot
make.

Therefore, France's operational pattern is to resist anything
that impinges on its understanding of its national interest. The
problem is that its national interests cannot be achieved alone,
and therefore it requires accommodation. Its national interest is
torn between resistance and accommodation. This creates a pattern
that is unsettling to all concerned. The Iraqis, who thought they
could rely on France, will be surprised that France, in the end,
ultimately will prove to be an ineffective defender. The United
States, which sees France increasingly as an adversary, will be
bemused as the country realigns itself and eventually claims --
and indeed will believe -- that it has always been in the last
position it occupies.

For France, Iraq represents two national interests. First, it has
direct national interests in Iraq -- oil, defense and other
markets. Second, and more important, France understands that a
U.S. occupation of Iraq would shift the global balance of power
even more in the favor of the United States. It is therefore in
the French national interest to resist. At the same time, all-out
resistance is impossible. By the nature of its foreign policy,
France finds it difficult to hold together coalitions. Standing
alone, France cannot resist the United States, nor can it resist
a rupture with the United States.

France will resist the United States with all of its might -- but
recognizing the limits of its might, it ultimately will
capitulate, formally or informally. France will carry out its
policies on multiple levels -- opposing on one, cooperating on
another. It will appear to be perfidious, as the current term
would have it, but it is simply torn in multiple directions, torn
by competing geography, dreams and nightmares. France will move
very quickly in many directions during any crisis. In the end, it
will wind up where it began. France appears insufferable, but it
is merely trapped by geography and history.

Don't forget to forward this email to a friend. To subscribe a
friend, click here
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=u

To unsubscribe, click here
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=k

Stratfor Services Now Available:

Join decision-makers around the world who read Stratfor for daily
intelligence briefs, in-depth analyses and forecasts on a wide
range of international security, political and economic affairs.

Individual subscribers, click here
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=d

Corporate or multi-user subscribers, click here
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=c

Stratfor's Iraq War Diary is a daily commentary on key events in
the march toward a U.S.-Iraq war.
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=b

The Global Intelligence Report is authoritative analysis of the
world's latest political and economic developments that is
emailed directly to members Monday through Friday.
http://www.stratfor.com/corp/Corporate.neo?s=SUB&c=a

http://www.stratfor.com
Strategic Forecasting, LLC


------ End of Forwarded Message

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as interesting-people () lists elistx com
To unsubscribe or update your address, click
  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/