Revoking DVD viewing rights AFTER legit purchase?

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Ken Horowitz <kenh () panix com>
Date: June 16, 2005 2:40:29 PM EDT
To: dave () farber net
Subject: Revoking DVD viewing rights AFTER legit purchase?


This article postulates that the rights to watch or play an HD DVD  
could be revoked
*after* purchase, creating all sorts of consumer and retailer  
problems. Sweeting is
unusual in the trades, in that he has an understanding of both the  
technology and
business issues involved.

PRIVILEGES REVOKED
Paul Sweeting
Video Business 6/10/05

http://videobusiness.com/commentary.asp?articleID=10700&catID=13

JUNE 10 | With the high-definition format-unification talks at an  
apparent impasse,
both sides have turned their focus to completing work on the copy- 
protection scheme
each side plans to use.

Called Advanced Access Content System, the system was developed  
jointly by Sony,
Toshiba, Warner Bros., Panasonic, Microsoft, Intel and IBM, making it  
the one area
in the entire high-def contest in which the two camps have been able  
to cooperate
effectively.

Sort of effectively, anyway.

The DVD Forum has already adopted AACS as the mandatory copy-protection
scheme for HD DVD, based on an early version of the spec. The Blu-ray  
Disc Assn.
has not yet formally endorsed the system but is expected to include  
it when final Blu-
ray specs are released.

What remains is to get final approval from the studios, the hardware  
camps, the PC
industry and other interested parties on the exact set of features  
and capabilities to
be included in the final spec and agreement on how the scheme will be  
implemented
on a worldwide basis.

Two groups not being formally consulted, however, are DVD and consumer
electronics retailers.

Copy-protection, of course, has generally been considered the domain  
of the studios
and hardware makers. But AACS represents such a departure from  
earlier copy-
protection schemes that it could provoke widespread consumer  
confusion, especially
in the early days of the formats, and perhaps even a backlash.

And as always, retailers will be the industry's first line of defense.

At the heart of AACS is the ability to "revoke" compromised playback  
devices.

Under the AACS scheme, each individual high-def DVD player will be  
issued a
unique set of decryption keys for decoding encrypted content. In normal
circumstances, any subset of keys can be used to decrypt any encoded  
movie.

If a particular device is used to rip a movie, however, the unique  
set of decryption
keys issued to that device can be "revoked" on all future releases,  
turning the
compromised device into an expensive paperweight.

That, of course, requires that the studios be able to trace an  
unauthorized copy of a
movie back to a particular set of device keys, and AACS includes  
forensic elements
to make that possible.

Unfortunately, some hacks are likely to be widely repeatable on other  
devices, the
same way DeCSS can be widely used to rip today's DVDs.

In that case, the studios' only effective option would be to disable  
an entire class of
devices, such as a particular make and model, sweeping up the  
innocent along with
the guilty.

That, obviously, is not a very practical option. But one partial  
solution might be to
pressure hardware makers to recall that particular class of device  
from retail shelves.

In that case, retailers could find themselves playing a central role  
in the enforcement
process.

Some studios are pressing for an additional level of protection that  
would allow
specific titles to be revoked.

Under that approach, dubbed the Virtual Machine, high-def DVD players  
would be
equipped with updatable "firmware," which could be "patched" to  
prevent the
playback of any title that has been found to have been ripped and  
widely copied.

The patches would be delivered either through an Internet connection  
on the player,
or through code embedded with all future titles.

Once a new, coded disc is inserted in the player, the device would be  
automatically
updated to prevent playback of the revoked title.

Once again, however, the system would not always be capable of  
distinguishing
between illegally obtained (i.e. downloaded) copies of a movie and  
legitimate copies.

Revoking a movie like Shrek 2 would ultimately create 30 million  
bewildered and
angry consumers whose legitimately purchased discs would no longer play.

So once again, the likely partial solution would be to recall all  
copies of a movie from
retail shelves until a new, updated version could be pressed and  
distributed.


-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as lists-ip () insecure org
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/