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more on Air Mauritania's innovative airline security
From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2007 09:16:33 -0500
Begin forwarded message: From: Adam Fields <ip20398470293845 () aquick org> Date: February 17, 2007 9:09:57 PM EST To: David Farber <dave () farber net> Cc: ip () v2 listbox com Subject: Re: [IP] more on Air Mauritania's innovative airline security For IP, if you wish: On Sat, Feb 17, 2007 at 08:52:28PM -0500, David Farber wrote: [...]
One has to wonder how the guy was able to get on board with not one, but two guns.
It's not at all that hard to wonder. Repeated tests have shown that the security screening isn't even CLOSE to 100% success. It's not even close to 50%, and this is just the tests of the public screening system, without any inside help or nefarious side channels (i.e.: walking directly through security with a weapon of some kind). This incident illustrates an important point. Keeping weapons off the plane is NOT the most important thing. It is not possible to hijack a plane anymore without killing or incapacitating everyone on board first - the passengers won't let you, as they'll now assume that they're going to die regardless of what you say, so they might as well do everything in their power to stop you. We keep coming back to this - in-place specific security measures are generally worth very little in actual security. There's much discussion out there on this, but here's the obligitory Schneier link, from which I quote: "What that means is that a basic cursory screening is good enough. If I were investing in security, I would fund significant research into computer-assisted screening equipment for both checked and carry-on bags, but wouldn't spend a lot of money on invasive screening procedures and secondary screening. I would much rather have well-trained security personnel wandering around the airport, both in and out of uniform, looking for suspicious actions. [...] And if I were investing in security, I would invest in intelligence and investigation. The best time to combat terrorism is before the terrorist tries to get on an airplane. The best countermeasures have value regardless of the nature of the terrorist plot or the particular terrorist target. In some ways, if we're relying on airport screeners to prevent terrorism, it's already too late. After all, we can't keep weapons out of prisons. How can we ever hope to keep them out of airports?" http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/airport_passeng.html -- - Adam ** Expert Technical Project and Business Management **** System Performance Analysis and Architecture ****** [ http://www.adamfields.com ] [ http://www.confabb.com ] ................ Latest Venture [ http://www.aquick.org/blog ] ............ Blog [ http://www.adamfields.com/resume.html ].. Experience [ http://www.flickr.com/photos/fields ] ... Photos [ http://www.aquicki.com/wiki ].............Wiki ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/@now Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
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- more on Air Mauritania's innovative airline security David Farber (Feb 18)