Interesting People mailing list archives
Re: RST packets as good network management
From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2008 09:43:50 -0700
________________________________________ From: Joe Touch [touch () ISI EDU] Sent: Thursday, April 24, 2008 12:35 PM To: David P. Reed Cc: David Farber; Brett Glass Subject: Re: [IP] Re: RST packets as good network management Dave (et al.), David P. Reed wrote:
... Regarding the use of "forgery" as a term, I agree with you that it overly politicizes the discussion. I would prefer "deliberate non-standard use with the intention to disrupt communications".
I agree that sending RSTs to shut down a connection - in general - is just nonstandard use. FINs are the standard way. However, this isn't the valid endpoint sending the RST; this is an intermediary forging it. There are standard ways of shutting connections that don't require forgery, e.g., ICMPs. Unfortunately, the ISPs can't rely on ICMP transit because they pioneered filtering ICMPs out. Once we all start using authentication E2E (and we're getting there), these forging attacks will be exposed more widely. Your definition of forgery above translates ANY illegal activity of ANY severity into "nonstandard use of X to disrupt Y". Let's please not react to "over politicizing" with "excessive application of political correctness". Or are you next going to try to sell us that a "nonstandard distruptive packet" (forgery) merely results in "differently-abled connections" (disabling TCP)? Joe ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Current thread:
- Re: RST packets as good network management David Farber (Apr 24)
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- Re: RST packets as good network management David Farber (Apr 24)
- Re: RST packets as good network management David Farber (Apr 24)