Interesting People mailing list archives
Re: The Internet's Biggest Security Hole | Threat Level from Wired.com
From: "David Farber" <dave () farber net>
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2008 19:21:06 -0400
________________________________ From: Steven M. Bellovin [mailto:smb () cs columbia edu] Sent: Thu 8/28/2008 4:25 PM To: DV Henkel-Wallace Cc: David Farber Subject: Re: [IP] Re: The Internet's Biggest Security Hole | Threat Level from Wired.com On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 13:01:47 -0700 DV Henkel-Wallace <gumby () henkel-wallace org> wrote:
From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb () cs columbia edu> Date: August 27, 2008 8:19:18 PM EDTAs I told Wired, "the good guys have been warning about this for 20 years, and nothing has happened!"Well the good guys gave a paper, not a PR effort.
We did a lot more than just write a few papers. Steve Kent and his colleagues, for example, had running code for SBGP, a compatible extension to BGP, no later than 2002 and I think earlier. There were presentations at NANOG, there were workshops, there were private meetings, there were lots of intense discussions, there were references to things like the AS 7007 incident and others like it, and there were and are IETF working groups. We even got the White House involved. The response has always been the same: the threat isn't real enough, the solution is too costly, and there is the possibility of operational outages if someone -- an end site, an ISP, an RIR, possibly up to ICANN itself -- makes an error on a routing-related certificate. The most recent meeting on the subject I attended was 1.5 weeks ago, and was scheduled before we were aware of this recent presentation. I admit we didn't give a public demo of an attack and invite the press (though on another mailing list I've complimented the folks who did this one). Beyond that, I'm rather at a loss for what more we could have done. The larger question is how one justifies spending money on security. I often liken it to life insurance: all of the money I paid for it last year was wasted, since I didn't die even once. In this case, ISPs have judged that what they pay now to clean up routing-related messes (Pakistan vs. YouTube is the best-known recent example, but there have been many others) is less than the cost of securing BGP. Perhaps that's been true up till now, but what about more serious, sustained, or damaging attacks? What if the spammers start using this technique more?
Plus 20 years later nobody has deployed anything beyond BGP....and how fast can _that_ be changed?
As I noted, BGP is extensible; all of the secure routing proposals on the table (and I can think of at least five without recourse to search engines) build on the existing protocol without breaking anything; a secured BGP site can talk to an older site with no problems whatsoever. A more interesting -- and still open -- research question is what benefits accrue during the period of partial deployment; I've been working on it. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb ------------------------------------------- Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
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