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Re How the Spies Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Fitbit
From: "Dave Farber" <farber () gmail com>
Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2018 22:42:58 -0500
Begin forwarded message:
From: L Jean Camp <ljeanc () gmail com> Date: February 4, 2018 at 5:30:13 PM EST To: Dave Farber <dave () farber net> Subject: Re: [IP] Re How the Spies Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Fitbit Reply-To: ljeanc () gmail com I went through the settings to see how to make Strava use private. This is what I read. To prevent your data being shared by Strava, require seven options on at least three screens, plus the initial "Choose Enhanced Privacy". But "Choose Enhanced Privacy is just a start. Hide Activities From Leaderboards, Change your FlyBy Options without those turned off, even with enhanced privacy on, you will still sometimes post your photo, name & run publicly, and will do so based on the activities of others. Particularly if there are only a few people running a route (*small base cough cough*) so that there is an isolated local Leaderboard. Then there is another screen.... ON Privacy Zones OFF Training Log Sharing OFF Strava Metro & Heatmap Data Sharing after you have turned everything else *off* you need the following *on* or your data will be shared with PII as part of the group. ON Enable Group Activity Enhanced Privacy, ON Followers & Block Athletes "one you've blocked will be able to see your activity entry in public areas like segment leaderboards, club feeds, and segment explore." Blocking *only* means "the blocked athlete will not be able to access your activity or profile page if they click on your entry." So a very pro-stalked feature design there. You choose enhanced privacy. You block someone. Annnnd they can view your "leaderboards, club feeds, and segment explore" which I believe means where you run often that others do not, when you hang with your friends and when you do something new. Of course no one uses these controls correctly. The controls are scattered around, the words "blocked" and "privacy" are argle bargle. Don't blame the victims! Prof. L. Jean Camp http://www.ljean.com Research Gate: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/L_Camp DBLP: http://dblp.uni-trier.de/pers/hd/c/Camp:L=_Jean SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=262477 Scholar: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wJPGa2IAAAAJ Make a Difference http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/govfel/congfel.aspOn Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 6:48 PM, Dave Farber <dave () farber net> wrote: ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Justin Maxwell <soc () code404 com> Date: Fri, Feb 2, 2018 at 5:37 PM Subject: Re: [IP] How the Spies Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Fitbit To: dave () farber net <dave () farber net> CC: ip <ip () listbox com> Hi Dave, Thanks for inviting this discussion on IP. I'm an avid Strava user and almost went to work there in the early days because I love their product. that FP article is fantastic, I had no idea this had such a legacy. But I want to address one thing since the "careless athlete" angle is getting sensationalized: “I am a Strava user with sharing enabled,” one former intelligence official told FP, who described running around GCHQ, the British signals intelligence agency. Sure, this person was careless. But most likely weren't. There is a key detail that is being left out of the public conversation mostly due to headline skimming. Strava was opting people in to the global heatmap data automatically, even if they had made their activities private. This is where everything went wrong: if a person was using Strava to track their fitness while stationed in a sensitive area, and believed they were respecting the rules of their station by marking their activity as "private" (which prevents it from showing to others or on leaderboards) That user was then unaware Strava had them "Opted-In" automatically to publish their activity data on the global heatmap Strava buried that info here: https://support.strava.com/hc/en-us/articles/207343930-Privacy-Options-and-Information The user had no idea their data was being leaked, as from their perspective (the information presented to them in the app's user experience & interface messaging), they had followed the rules So to be clear, it was Strava who opted in their users to leak this information without considering the impact of it. On Feb 2 2018, at 11:37 am, Dave Farber <farber () gmail com> wrote: Begin forwarded message: From: Richard Forno <rforno () infowarrior org> Date: February 2, 2018 at 12:28:06 PM EST To: Infowarrior List <infowarrior () attrition org> Cc: Dave Farber <dave () farber net> Subject: How the Spies Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Fitbit How the Spies Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Fitbit The debate over whether fitness trackers should be allowed in sensitive areas has dragged on for years. By Jenna McLaughlin | February 1, 2018, 12:38 PM When researchers last weekend noticed that a private company had published a global heat map of people running and walking around, based on data uploaded from its fitness application, the news sparked renewed debate in the U.S. national security community about rules governing wearable devices that transmit data. What wasn’t disclosed by the intelligence and military officials reacting to the news is that the debate over whether fitness trackers should be allowed in sensitive spaces, particularly in intelligence outposts, has raged on for years. And many employees did in fact gain the right to wear certain types of trackers, even in the most sensitive locations. However, that decision has consistently led to internal disagreement. In some cases, military and intelligence officials have wide discretion over where and when their employees can use those devices. “We are aware of the potential impacts of devices that collect and report personal and locational data, such as information contained in the Strava ‘heat map’ recently reported in the press,” a current U.S. intelligence official wrote in an email to Foreign Policy. “The use of personal fitness and similar devices by individuals engaged in U.S. Government support is determined and directed by each agency and department.” < - > https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/01/how-the-spies-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-fitbit/ Archives | Modify Your Subscription | Unsubscribe Now Archives | Modify Your Subscription | Unsubscribe Now
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- Re How the Spies Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Fitbit Dave Farber (Feb 04)
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