REVIEW: "Security Engineering", Ross Anderson

[InfoSec News <isn () c4i org>]

Forwarded from: "Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor, Devon & Hannah" <rslade () sprint ca>

BKSECENG.RVW   20021015

[ http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471389226/c4iorg  - WK]

"Security Engineering", Ross Anderson, 2001, 0-471-38922-6, U$65.00
%A   Ross Anderson ross.anderson () ieee org rja14 () cam ac uk
%C   5353 Dundas Street West, 4th Floor, Etobicoke, ON   M9B 6H8
%D   2001
%G   0-471-38922-6
%I   John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
%O   U$65.00 416-236-4433 fax: 416-236-4448
%P   612 p.
%T   "Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed
      Systems"

The preface states that this book is intended as a text for self-study
or for a one term course, a reference for professionals, an
introduction to the underlying concepts, and an original scientific
contribution in terms of the foundational principles for security
engineering.  A very tall order to promise, but one which, for once,
seems to have been fulfilled.  I have often been asked, in regard to
these reviews, whether there are, in fact, any books that I like. 
Well, I like this one.  If you are involved with security and you
haven't read it, you should.

Part one deals with the basic concepts of engineering and security. 
Chapter one presents four example situations of security needs. 
Protocols are not limited to the precise but limited structures
computer people are familiar with.  A set of more conceptual, but more
formal, authentication problems and protocols are advanced in chapter
two.  It is unlikely that the models presented exhaust the field, but
some thought indicates that they are applicable to a wide variety of
applications.  (Anderson's writing is clear enough, but he does betray
a taste for symbolic logic that might limit the audience for the book. 
Still, perserverence on the part of the reader will be amply
rewarded.)  Much the usual thoughts and advice on passwords is issued
in chapter three, although the research is better documented, and some
additional research (passphrase generated passwords are as secure as
randomly assigned ones, and as memorable as naively chosen ones) is
presented.  It is strange not to see any mention of the work factor of
passwords overall.  Chapter four reviews access control, but primarily
from the perspective of system and hardware internals.  Cryptography,
in chapter five, is covered reliably and well, although Anderson does
not work overly hard to make the material easy to follow.  The
problems of distributed systems are examined; in terms of concurrency,
failure resistance, and naming; in chapter six.

Part two uses a number of applications of secure systems to introduce
particular concepts or technologies.  Chapter seven discusses multi-
level security, which encompasses most of the formal security models
such as Bell-LaPadula.  Medical (and census) databases are used, in
chapter eight, as examples of multilateral, or compartmented,
security: the need to deal with information of equal sensitivity, but
restricted to different groups.  There is good discussion of inference
and aggregation problems.  Integrity controls, particularly related to
the banking system and fraud, are presented in chapter nine, although
the material is long on anecdotes, and contains weaker analysis than
the preceding text.  Chapter ten reviews monitoring systems, of both
monitoring and metering types.  In regard to nuclear command and
control systems, chapter eleven examines the tension between
availability (the ability to fire a missile) and confidentiality (or
authentication: making sure nobody else does).  Various aspects of the
technology for security printing and seals is dealt with in chapter
twelve.  Biometrics, in chapter thirteen, gets a good, but fairly
standard, treatment.  Chapter fourteen delves into tamper-resistance
in cryptographic gear and smartcards.  The TEMPEST and Teapot (no, I'm
not kidding) projects on emission security are reviewed in chapter
fifteen.  There is good coverage of the basics of traditional
electronic warfare in chapter sixteen, although the material on
information warfare is not as thorough.  Chapter seventeen looks at
telecommunications system security, with some material on phone
phreaking and lots on cellular encryption.  Network attack and
defense, in chapter eighteen, is less focussed than other chapters,
and adds malware.  (There is an odd, and unexplained, assertion that
malware would formerly have merited a full chapter: In correspondence,
Anderson has said that the new email viruses show less diversity than
the old DOS versions.  I disagree.  But then, I would, wouldn't I? 
:-)  The relation of types of antiviral and intrusion detection
systems is good.  Chapter nineteen, on protecting e-commerce systems,
has good information but mixed in a bit of a grab bag: e-commerce is
always a bit of a fuzzy topic.  There is solid coverage of recent
controversies in regard to copyright and privacy protection, in
chapter twenty.

Part three turns to politics, management, and assurance.  Chapter
twenty one has a fascinating discussion of major issues in public
policy.  Management issues, in chapter twenty two, are presented in an
interesting but generic manner.  The discussion of system evaluation
and assurance asks the usual question of how we know our systems are
secure.  In a sense, though, the subtitle of the book is wrong: much
of the material points out how *not* to build dependable systems, and
chapter twenty three is a bit disheartening.  The conclusion, in
chapter twenty four, is that we need more engineers and engineering.

Although the material is presented in a very formal way, the writing
is usually quite readable, and the exceptional stilted passages are
still accessible to the determined reader.  On occasion, one could
hope for additional explanations of some items that are mentioned
briefly and passed over, but, by and large, one has to agree with
Bruce Schneier's assessment, reprinted on the book jacket, that this
is one of the most comprehensive works on security concepts that is
available.  The constant emphasis on how security protections have
failed can be depressing, but the examination of the errors of others
does provide the basis for better designs in the future.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 2002   BKSECENG.RVW   20021015


======================  (quote inserted randomly by Pegasus Mailer)
rslade () vcn bc ca  rslade () sprint ca  slade () victoria tc ca p1 () canada com
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                                                  - G. K. Chesterton
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