Re: Incentive for route stabilty

[Eric Ziegast <ziegast () im gte com>]

> Finanical compensation for bgp dampening policies.
>
> Deep pockets = very little flap penalty
> Shallow pockets = very heavy flap penalty

The main risk (IMHO) when accepting a new peer is how stable the peer
is.  Without confidence in the design of the peer's network or trust
in its engineers to prevent/solve problems, connecting to a new peer
with a significant number of routes can be scary.  A peer's having
deep pockets usually implies that there's more to lose if they mess
up and that they _might_ want to hire good engineers and pre-plan
their network, but whether they actually do is another story.  :^(

Perhaps ISPs/NSPs could build "trial periods" into their peering
policies where a peer's learned routes are dampened with a high
flap penalty.  If a provider meets the pre-determined "quality
of service level", the dampening is reduced or even removed at the
end of the trial period.  If they don't, the agreement is broken
and you route the peer's traffic through their transit provider
instead (which hopefully have some dampening in place).  If a good
peer starts having service-affecting problems, put them back on
"trial period" (aka probation) and notify them.  If you don't live
up to your own standards, the idea of having a trial period is moot.

--
Eric Ziegast
Looking in from the edge
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