Re: RBL-type BGP service for known rogue networks?

["Chris" <chris () bgpconsulting com>]

That is funny C&W has never had problems tracing attacks through there ATM
PVCs. Sounds to me like UUnet just doesn't want to.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Kai Schlichting" <kai () pac-rim net>
To: <nanog () merit edu>
Sent: Friday, July 07, 2000 11:22 AM
Subject: RE: RBL-type BGP service for known rogue networks?


> At Friday 04:28 AM 7/7/00, Joe Shaw wrote:
>
> > UUNet's abuse department used to be the same way, especially during the
> > weekend.  If you wanted to annoy the piss out of a UUNet dedicated line
> > customer, the weekend was the time to do it.  I don't know if that's
> > changed now.
>
> Winds are shifting. One of the original spam floods that trigggered the
> creation of SpamShield, was from an Alternet dialup, and it took them
> a mere 10 minutes to shut that account off. That must have been a
different
> department at the time:
>
> Try being on the receiving end of a spoofed/randomized SYN/anything
> flood that doesn't exceed, say: 1Mbps and doesn't load UUnet's network
> so much. They won't even lift a damn finger and TRY to trace this back,
> supposedly because they can't trace it back through their ATM PVCs
> (an argument that has been backed up by other people I spoke to).
> They will happily charge you for the traffic though.
> A network design that doesn't allow tracing back spoofed traffic?
> Way to go, UUnet.
>
> And yes, I remember CenterTrack: http://www.nanog.org/mtg-9910/robert.html
,
> it just wasn't in production at the time - and I have no idea if it was
> ever deployed successfully.
>
> Now, lets watch Vijay rush to the defense of his, uhm, stock options.