Re: Sonet protection usage

[William Allen Simpson <wsimpson () greendragon com>]

Bora Akyol wrote:
> Note that I am not a big fan of APS, but:
> ...
> I think this is a huge oversimplification of APS and how it works. Yes APS
> allows the
> **operator** to backup various primaries to a backup. It allows 1:1 which is
> same as diverse
> circuits. This is the case of a rope that is **long enough**.
OK, since it "allows" 1:1, taking the same capacity as 2 circuits, why do 
you think that they charge less than for 2 circuits?

Alternatively, since 2 circuits are paid for, why not use both, 
doubling capacity?

My opinion (based on a fair number of years of experience) is that any 
ISP foolish enough to have bought APS should also ask proof that no 
other circuit is provisioned for the same APS.  Once you've done that, 
a class action might be in order....

APS is specified to switch a failing circuit over to a backup within 50 
milliseconds.  It assumes that failure is in a multiplexor.  It assumes 
that most of the circuits will be statistically idle.  It assumes that 
the individual T3 (OC-1) paths are burstable, and can be recombined at 
the path or section layer.  It assumes that 50 milliseconds is short 
relative to switching time.  In short, it assumes voice.  Data doesn't 
look like that at all!

If the failure is actually due to the usual circumstances, a lot of 
data "circuits" fail all at once.  There is no chance that they will all 
be backed up.

APS (as sold) is a fraud on the uninformed.


> Well-engineered trans-oceanic links are laid such that there are at least
> two conduits running parallel
> some large distance apart.
And which are those?  I was unaware that any were laid that way.  My 
information is dated on that topic, tho'.  (The only one I ever viewed 
was pre-optical.)


> Or you can run 1+1 IP Bonded interfaces and achieve the same effect ;-)
Unless it has vastly improved since I last tried it, bonding does not 
work well over diverse paths, due to timing differences.

WSimpson () UMich edu
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