nanog mailing list archives

Re: New Internet-draft on DDOS defense...


From: "Vipul Shah" <svipul () novell com>
Date: Fri, 12 May 2000 00:53:16 -0600



I have some concerns with this draft. The proposed change does lower the
risk of damages if one system on a shared-media LAN is compromised, but
only for this one type of attack. It seems to me it'd be possible to
generate other types of packets which are broadcast/multicast which
could elicit an ICMP response, and such attacks are not something which
can be cured without breaking a lot of functionality. While ICMP ECHO
packets are a preferred mechanism today, they're far from the only types
of packets which are problematic.

Where RFC2644 prevents ALL types of directed broadcast traffic, this
draft will only have a useful impact on ICMP ECHO, and only in a limited
case. I have to question whether there's sufficient benefit here to
warrant opening up the IP stacks on end stations.


Will you please list down the other types of  packets (apart from ICMP
ECHO packets) used to generate broadcast response and can lead to
 an attack. We can extend our solution further to include other types of 
packets, if possible.

An alternative to the suggested approach is the use of packet filters on
end stations. For example, with Linux systems (and probably others)
ipchains can be used to filter the types of traffic a host will respond
to, regardless of what a border router or firewall ahead of it allows. I
generally advocate the use of such facilities where possible as it adds
an extra line of defense.

Rate limiting of certain types of traffic (e.g. ICMP) is also a way to
address the type of problem this draft is concerned with, and again is
capable of addressing all ICMP, rather than just ICMP ECHO/ECHO REPLY.

Rate limiting and filtering may reduce the impact of Smurf attack, but the attack
 itself is not prevented!

Vipul


Overall impression of the draft: not a terrible idea, but unclear if
it's sufficiently beneficial to warrant the effort to implement.

Dan
-- 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Senie                                        dts () senie com 
Amaranth Networks Inc.                    http://www.amaranth.com 





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